Special sciences are those sciences other than fundamental physics. In this view, chemistry, biology, and neuroscience—indeed, all sciences except fundamental physics—are special sciences. The status of the special sciences, and their relation to physics, is unresolved in the philosophy of science. Jerry Fodor, for instance, has argued for strong autonomy, concluding that the special sciences are not even in principle reducible to physics. As such Fodor has often been credited for having helped turn the tide against reductionist physicalism.
See also
- Emergence – Unpredictable phenomenon in complex systems
- Emergentism – Philosophical belief in emergence
- Multiple realizability – Thesis in the philosophy of mind
- Reductionism – Philosophical view explaining systems in terms of smaller parts
- Supervenience – Relation between sets of properties or facts
- The central science – Term often associated with chemistry
- Unity of science – Theory in the philosophy of science
References
- Fodor, J. (1974). "Special Sciences (Or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)". Synthese. 28 (2): 97–115. doi:10.1007/BF00485230. S2CID 46979938.
- Jaegwon, Kim (2005). Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton University Press. p. 95.
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