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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Dailycare (talk | contribs) at 18:03, 15 December 2012 (→Jerusalem: new section). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Your absence over the years has been strongly regretted, and I am refreshed to see you here again, even if you intimate that you will only contribute on this version of wiki occasionally. It has so far taken 5 years, but the al-Husseini article you prompted me to work on is certainly in much better shape that most of the junk about him on the net. If you have the time, I'd appreciate you casting a critical glance at it and finding out if there's anything that needs more serious work. Best Nishidani (talk) 06:28, 20 June 2012 (UTC)

Thank you Nishidani. I will have a deep look at this.

Pluto2012 (talk) 07:12, 20 June 2012 (UTC)

Talkback

Philippe Beaudette, Wikimedia Foundation (talk) 03:17, 24 June 2012 (UTC)

Rather perplexed, and no quick answer required. For your deliberation

The figures for combatants in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.Laurens, La Question de Palestine, tome 3 (2007) pp.105-6 p.105 has an interesting table based on a contemporary intelligence summary. Two things (re the flagicon matter, on which I have agreed with you).

• It lists the Lebanese and Saudi armies. His narrative of course suggests, certainly for the Lebanese, that, as recent studies affirm, weren't quite part of the mythical 5/6 corrdinated national armies attack on May 15. But he does list them.
• Secondly, the figures. Our infobox has huge figures, which perhaps may show the results of combatants on the warfront throughout that war. I don't know. But they are way out of whack with the initial numbers arrayed, which was the calculated numbers on the front on the day of the invasion, which Laurens puts, at the outset at 20,000 for the non-Palestinian contingents (plus an indeterminate number of Palestinians) as opposed to 30,000-35,000 for the Israeli armed forces on the eve of this second phase in the conflict.

People, which editors mostly are, hate nuances, while the historians takes as his motto that the devil in the details is to be faced and exorcised by the absolution of facts. I don't ask that you reply to this. It is best to simply mull the points over at leisure, and in one's den, until one can see if any adjustment is required, or this source, and my reflections on it, can be dismissed as not quite abreast, unlike yourself, with the latest specialist research on this vexed issue. Best wishes. No need to reply. Nishidani (talk) 20:58, 3 July 2012 (UTC)

Hi Hishidani,

I agree that the initial numbers are important to have a complete information. The main problem is that the forces changed a lot during the war as it is difficult to display a synthetic picture that would be fair regarding this issue, particularly on 15 May.

Usually, historians take into account only the mobile or semi-mobiles forces. About these, on May 15, by my memory, there was 5000 Egyptians + 5000 volunteers on their side + 6000 Arab Legion forces + 5000 Iraki + 3000 Syrians + 6000 ALA volunteers. To this, maybe 2000-3000 thousands Palestians from Jihad al Muqqadas. In front of them, there was 6 Haganah brigades (15,000-20,000) + 3 Palmach brigades (9000-1200 ?) + IZL (3000) + LHI (800). Next to this, all villagers and kibbutz had small fixed forces and Yishuv was in full mobilisation (creation of the 7th brigade and reinforcement of all others).

I already tried to summarize what historians say but their number differ too much and numbers have no more sense.

What I find interesting (but this is pure OR - no historian states that in these words) is that on May 15, the Arabs had not a single chance given the forces that they engaged in the fights were too small but would have they mobilised 6 months sooner and therefore had engaged on May 15, what was ready in October 1948, they would have crushed Yishuv with not far from 70,000 trained soldiers. So, New Historians are right that they Arab and the Palesitians had no chances but Israelis had good reasons to fear the extermination. Of course, Palestinians are even more right when they remind they had not a single chance in any scenario. Pluto2012 (talk) 09:08, 17 November 2012 (UTC)

Thanks, pal. I agree. Wars are won or lost by logistical efficiency, munition supplies, tactical coordination under a unified and networked central command, and morale, of course. In all these regards, there is no doubt that Israel was far better placed to win the conflict than its allies: the only forced that constituted a real threat was the Jordanian army under Glubb, which probably was the equal if not the superior in all these dimensions. Laurens gives the following breakdown, saying only a fraction of the Iraqi and Egyptian forces were employed, being ill-prepared, in Palestine-

• Syrian army 1,500
• Lebanese army 1,000
• Iraki army 1,500
• Jordanian army 4,500
• Saudi force 1,500
• Egyptian army and volunteers 10,000

Total =20,000 (Laurens, 3:105-6)

Add some thousands of Palestinians and Arab volunteers and you get less than 30,000

Israel had 30,-35,000 troops, which included the 6,000 Palmach elite, while the highly motrivated Irgun and Stern/Lehi forces amounted to 3,000. (p.106)

If you analyse the casualties, on the other hand, the strong numerical advantage of the Israeli forces vs those of the uncoordinated Arabs is reversed.

Israel suffered some 6,000 deaths and double that figure in wounded, amounting to 1% of the Yishuv's population.

By contrast, the casualties by the numerically inferior Arab forces are half that.

• Egypt 961 dead, plus 200 irregulars
• Jordan: 362 plus 200 irregulars
• Iraq 199 plus 200 irreguliars
• S.Arabia 68 plus 105 irregulars
• Lebanon 11 plus 150 irregulars
• Syria 307 plus 204 irregulars
• l'armée de secours 512

Others (Yemen, Sudan, N. African) 200

Non-Arabs (Armenians, Greeks, Europeans, Hindus) 42

Totalling 3,700

With regard to Palestinians who fought, there the figures are particularly high, if we can trust Laurens's figures for the number who engaged in the war.

• Palestinians who died in combat 1,953
• Unknown names, but number, place and date known: 4,004
• Names and dates not known but places of death known 7,043

=13,000 Palestinians, double the number of Jewish losses, and statistically, in terms of relative populations, far greater a percentage of the relevant population. The largest part of Palestinian loses however relates to non-combatants.(Laurens 3:194)

We're not editing so WP:OR is irrelevant here. I think personally that the scenario of 5/6 invading outside national armies vs one small Yishuv force dominates historiography. If one analyses just the Israeli and Palestinian figures (and Palestinians had no united command or army) then one's perspective on the actual ground would probably alter the classical account considerably. In a year's combat the outside Arab forces and Israelis suffered an attrition rate of some 13-15% of committed forces. If one looks at the fighting between Israeli units and Palestinian villagers, then the latter suffered massive losses, much of them civilian. We are only amateur (in the best sense) students of history, of course. But it is useful to keep these figures in mind as one reads each new professional book on the period. Best wishes. Nishidani (talk) 10:44, 17 November 2012 (UTC)

Talkback

Emmette Hernandez Coleman (talk) 17:32, 16 November 2012 (UTC)

Kind request

I kindly ask you to stop going araound all my well sourced editions, reverting them one by one. Please take this message as my notification that I take this incident very seriously. On the page regarding the Nazi relationship with Arab world, 4 editors supported the current wording and you do not have consensus for removal of well sourced material.--Tritomex (talk) 13:34, 17 November 2012 (UTC)

Workshop on Misplaced Pages and the Middle East

Hi Pluto2012, I noticed that you edit a lot of articles about the Middle East and I'm organising a workshop for a group of researchers from the University of Oxford and the American University of Sharjah, about representation of the Middle East and North Africa region on Misplaced Pages. We held a workshop in Cairo for Wikipedians in October 2012 to discuss barriers to participation on Arabic Misplaced Pages. Our next workshop will be taking place in Amman, Jordan on the 26th-27th January 2013. We have funds to pay for participants' travel, accommodation and food. This workshop will concentrate more specifically on the representation of parts of the MENA region on Misplaced Pages and the ability of local editors to contribute to those representations. We are therefore looking for participants who edit articles about the MENA region (can be places, local historical or current events, local people etc.) We wanted to invite you because we noticed you have been involved in editing about contentious topics in the region and would really value your input. If you want to know more about this workshop, please contact me on wikiproject@oii.ox.ac.uk. Many thanks, Clarence (Project Manager)OIIOxford (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 13:48, 20 November 2012 (UTC)

There's a discussion at Talk:Transport in the Palestinian territories#What is the scope of this article? about what the weather the scope of that article should be the Palestinian territories or the "region under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority", i.e. Area's A and B of the Palestinian territories. In particular I would like to know if you would object to the article's scope covering the Palestinian territories, rather then just area's A and B. I invited the percipients in a similar discussion, but I later realized that there seamed to be a "The PNA is just a government" conclusion there which is disputed at Talk:Palestinian_National_Authority#Palestinian_Authority_-_an_organization_.28government.29_or_a_geopolitical_entity.3F, so I'm inviting you and Japinderum to that discussion to compensate for that bias that I accidentally introduced. Emmette Hernandez Coleman (talk) 05:16, 25 November 2012 (UTC)

Talkback

brewcrewer (yada, yada) 14:21, 27 November 2012 (UTC)

1948 Palestinian exodus

Perhaps it will help us come to more agreement if I understood your interpretation of the events of April 1948. Or, rather than sharing an interpretation which might be misconstrued by others in any way, you might point me in the direction of a book which better illustrates your understanding. You are also more than welcome to message me personally if you feel that your views are better protected in that way. I'm confident that we can work together to create statements in an encyclopedic tone which are neither spurious nor vague. ClaudeReigns (talk) 13:59, 4 December 2012 (UTC)

You may stard with Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited and the critics that he received from Norman Finkelstein and Nur Masalha

Then read Yoav Gelber, Palestine 1948 and Rosemary Esber, Under the Cover of War.

If you succeed in writing something on the topic and state "all these 5 scholars would agree with what I write", then you can claim that you understand and practice WP:NPOV with excellence.

Pluto2012 (talk) 10:07, 5 December 2012 (UTC)

So far, I have searched these texts for each author's thesis as to the main cause of the evacuations. I feel that certain sources should carry more weight than others, especially since there is a dialectic process between Morris and Masalha. Finkelstein's work taken as a whole is problematic. Gelber zeems to engage in logical fallacy. Beyond the main thesis, I have not had a chance to explore Rosemarie Esber's "Under the Cover of War" to make any judgment on the text. These were good suggestions and I took the main debate a step further, reading "Response to Finkelstein and Masalha" by Morris.

Whereas Masalha's critique of Birth reads:

Morris' findings constitute a landmark and are a remarkable contribution to our knowledge because they show that the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians was a result of direct attacks, fear of attacks, intimidation, psychological warfare (e.g., the whispering campaign), and sometimes outright expulsions ordered by the Haganah/IDF leadership.

Morris replies:

I ended up with a multi-causal explanation in which the primary precipitants of flight, in most places, and at most times, were Jewish attack and the fear of Jewish attack.

Is there perhaps a better criticism of New Historians than Gelber? ClaudeReigns (talk) 13:08, 5 December 2012 (UTC)

Hi ClaudeReigns,

If you decide who is right and who is wrong by advance, you may move forward very fast but not in the right direction.

You should read Morris and Gelber's book and not just read what is said about these or just take some parts of their books. If you don't like Gelber, you can try Karsh but his work is poor and biaised, on the contrary of the one of Gelber's. If you read Karsh, read also Pappé. There is no problem with Finkelstein's work. Anybody is able to read what he says and with some know-how on the topic consider if what he says is pertinent or not.

After reading Morris, you can read these articles :

• Finkelstein, Norman (1991), Myths, Old and New, Institute for Palestine Studies, XXI, n°1, pp. 66-89.
• Masalha, Nur (1991), A critique of Benny Morris, Institute for Palestine Studies, XXI, n°1, pp. 90-97.
• Morris, Benny (1991), Response to Finkelstein and Masalha, Institute for Palestine Studies, XXI, n°1, pp. 98-114.
• Finkelstein, Norman (1992), Rejoinder to Benny Morris, Institute for Palestine Studies, XXI, n°2, pp. 61-71.
• Khalidi, Walid (1993), Benny Morris and Before their Diaspora, Institute for Palestine Studies, XXII, n°3, pp. 106-119.
• Masalha, Nur (1995), Review Essay: '1948 and After' Revisited, Institute for Palestine Studies, XXIV, n°4, pp. 90-95.
• Karsh, Efraïm (1996), Rewriting Israels History, Middle East Quatterly, III, n°2.
• Morris, Benny (1996), Undeserving of a Reply, Middle East Quatterly, III, n°3.
• Shlaim, Avi, A Totalitarian Concept of History, Middle East Quatterly, III, n°3.

Pluto2012 (talk) 07:22, 6 December 2012 (UTC)

Not about right or wrong, per se, but just accuracy on a particular point. A contrary assertion without real evidence is not weighty. I would rather read Karsh nit-pick certain peripheral points in a logically accurate manner to be assured a wider argument is not distorted. I would also hope that Karsh's corrections to Morris go well noted, so as not to distort other authors who rely upon him as a source. Vis a vis Deir Yassin, I think Karsh halfway poo-pooed Morris' claim that the fear inspired evacuation - and then instead of positively sourcing a Palestinian pointing to another cause, he just makes further assertions about Haganah intent (not relevant to Palestinian motivation) and how Deir Yassin is not interprested (again, says nothing about Palestinian motivation in 1948). Quite frustrating.

All the while I have the picture in my head of the Palestinian Arabs which Brunner had on camera talking about how they were afraid after Deir Yassin. Makes for a very plausible motive. Nothing about this ascribes intent. It's not a discussion about intent. The tales were likely exaggerated, true, it's like a game of "telephone" - messages are always distorted the more they spread. Most of the time, Gelber is spot on. But not engaging a supported point effectively, to me, is yielding that point to the consensus. At least this is my line of thought at this time.

Which makes me wonder how I'll view Esber when I get around to reading her. Masalha was so busy praising her, he forgot to say Massllah, but none of the other scholars responded (at least as far as I've been able to find). Which either means 1) there's no refutation 2) no one considers an Arab woman worthy of refutation 3) no one considers her arguments worthy of refutation. The tone Finkelstein and Morris debating was unpleasant. Rather unacademic, especially considering what's at stake. I want to devour all of the sourcing you've laid before me, but I have to prioritize because my time is not unlimited. And so I begin with what challenges me, and avoid the logical failures which are easier to discount. I must hope that this process leads me in the right direction, because it has served me well elsewhere and has been used successfully by others elsewhere. But without your guidance, I would not have had the opportunity to test these deeper waters. ClaudeReigns (talk) 10:20, 6 December 2012 (UTC)

Jerusalem

Hi, I was typing a comment to the "@tariqabjotu" thread but then decided against saving it. As tariq may get very upset if I address his arguments, I figured I can help him keep his composure. However, here is the comment I typed, feel free to use it if you feel like it, or to not use if if you don't feel like it, I leave it entirely to you. --Dailycare (talk) 18:03, 15 December 2012 (UTC)

Concerning "this article should be written based on reality", to be exact this article should be written based on high-quality sources rather than editorial views on what constitutes reality. WP:NPOV states "Avoid stating seriously contested assertions as facts". The BBC's editorial policy describes Jerusalem's capital-of-Israel status as an unrecognized claim. As it relates to mentioning the Israeli and Palestinian claims side by side, that should turn on whether sources mention them side by side. There are such sources in this edit.