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Operation Matterhorn
Part of the Pacific Theatre of World War II
Locations of B-29 bomber bases in China and the main targets they attacked in East Asia during Operation Matterhorn
Date 1944 Location East Asia and Southeast Asia
Belligerents
United States	Japan
Units involved
XX Bomber Command

Operation Matterhorn was a military operation of the United States Army Air Forces in World War II for the strategic bombing of Japanese forces by Boeing B-29 Superfortresses based in India and China. Targets included industrial facilities in Japan and Japanese bases in China and Southeast Asia. The name comes from the Matterhorn, a mountain traditionally considered particularly difficult to climb.

Background

B-29 Superfortress

On 29 January 1940, the United States Army Air Corps issued a request to five major aircraft manufacturers to submit designs for a four-engine bomber with a range of 2,000 miles (3,200 km). These designs were evaluated, and on 6 September orders were placed for two experimental models each from Boeing and Consolidated Aircraft. These became the Boeing B-29 Superfortress and the Consolidated B-32 Dominator. These became known as very long range (VLR) bombers. On 17 May 1941, Boeing was ordered to commence the manufacture of the B-29 when ready. Boeing devoted its plants in Renton, Washington and Wichita, Kansas to B-29 production; assemblies would later also be built by the Bell Aircraft Corporation in Marietta, Georgia, and the Glenn L. Martin Company in Omaha, Nebraska. The first prototype XB-29 made its maiden flight on 21 September 1942, but the second prototype crashed on 18 February 1943, killing Boeing test pilot Edmund T. Allen, his 10-man crew, and 20 people on the ground; a firefighter also died fighting the blaze. B-29 production was given overriding priority.

Plans

Ostensibly, the B-29 was intended to defend the Western Hemisphere against encroachment by a hostile foreign power, but as early as September 1939, Colonel Carl Spaatz had suggested that it might be used to bomb Japan from bases in Siberia, Luzon or the Aleutian Islands. The Air Corps' first war plan, AWPD-1, issued in September 1941, called for B-29s to bomb Germany from bases in Great Britain and Egypt by 1944. Early war plans did not contemplate bombing Japan until after the war against Germany was won. The idea of basing the Superfortresses in China first surfaced at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. In March, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Major General Laurence S. Kuter, initiated a detailed study of the possibility of using VLR bombers based in China. No other bases within range of Japan were expected to be in Allied hands in 1944.

Support for the effort would have to come through the port of Calcutta, which was estimated to be able to handle the additional 596,000 long tons (606,000 t) per month. From there, supplies would be flown to China in Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers converted to Consolidated C-87 Liberator Express transport aircraft. About 200 would be required to support each VLR bomber group, with 2,000 C-87s in operation by October 1944 and 4,000 by May 1945. It was estimated that five missions per group per month could be flown, with 168 group-months being sufficient to destroy all targets in Japan within twelve months. The staff of the China Burma India Theater (CBI) were invited to comment, and they opined that the plan was too optimistic about the logistical challenges involved. On request, the CBI Theater commander, Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell submitted an alternative plan drafted by his air commander, Major General George E. Stratemeyer, codenamed "Twilight", that called for more time, a smaller effort, and reduced logistical support. Under this plan, the bombers would be based in the Calcutta area and only staged through Chinese bases for missions. Keeping the ground crews in India would reduce the logistical footprint in China. Stilwell cautioned that the likely Japanese response to any success by the bombers would be a ground offensive to capture the airfields. It was estimated that the first raids on Japan could be mounted as early as April 1944.

In April 1943, the Chief of the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), GeneralHenry H. Arnold, set up a special B-29 project under Brigadier General Kenneth B. Wolfe. Wolfe became responsible for preparing, organizing and training B-29 units for combat. By September, he had prepared a plan for operations based on Twilight called "Matterhorn"; soon after the Twilight plan was renamed "Drake". The important difference between the plans was that under Matterhorn the B-29s would stage through Chengtu in Szechwan province in western China whereas under Drake they would stage through Kweilin in eastern China. Moving the B-29 bases further from the front lines allowed the ground defense to be dispensed with, and the air defenses to be scaled back to two fighter groups that would be assigned to the Fourteenth Air Force. Supplies would be stockpiled in China by the B-29s themselves, assisted by the B-24s of Fourteenth Air Force's 308th Bombardment Group. Arnold approved the plan on 12 October. On 10 November 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a massage to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, asking him to render assistance with the construction of bases in India and one to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek asking him to provide labor and materials for the construction of five advanced bases in China, which the United States would pay for under Reverse Lend-Lease. Although Drake still had its advocates, Matterhorn was formally approved by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Sextant Conference in Cairo on 7 December.

When the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff had previously met at the First Quebec Conference in August 1943, they had tentatively authorized a Central Pacific drive that included the capture of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, Truk, Palau and the Mariana Islands, the last perhaps in early 1946. The air staff planners began incorporating the Marianas into their plans as a potential base for the B-29s in September 1943. This was formally approved at Cairo. By January 1944, there was consideration of advancing the Central Pacific timetable by bypassing Truk and heading directly for Palau after the capture of the Marshalls, but senior army and navy officers in the Pacific doubted the utility of basing B-29s in the Marianas due to the limited harbor facilities there. A January 1944 study by the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) assessed the Mariana Islands as the best location for the deployment of the B-29s, but in view of the fact that they would not be captured until later in the year, recommended that the first B-29 groups be deployed to the Southwest Pacific Area to attack the petroleum refineries in the Netherlands East Indies or to India and China to attack industrial targets in Japan. In March 1944, the timetable for the Central Pacific advance was revised. Truk was to be bypassed and the Palau operation was postponed until 15 September, after the capture of the southern Mariana Islands, which was now scheduled to commence on 15 June 1944. The new timetable was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 March.

Targeting

In March 1943, Arnold had asked the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) to prepare an analysis of strategic targets in Japan whose destruction might affect the course of the war. Moat of Japan's war industries lay within the 1,500-mile (2,400 km) range of a B-29 with a ten-ton bomb load. The COA had been created in December 1942, and its membership included officers from the Army and Navy, along with distinguished civilians consultants such as Edward M. Earle, Thomas W. Lamont, Clark H. Minor and Elihu Root Jr. In a report delivered on 11 November 1943, they identified six preferred economic targets:

1. Merchant shipping;
2. Steel production;
3. Urban industrial areas;
4. Aircraft plants
5. Ball bearings; and
6. Electronics.

Particular vulnerable were the ball bearing industry, which relied on six major plants, and the steel industry, which was dependent on a small number of coke plants located on Kyushu and in Manchuria and Korea—all within range of B-29s based at Chengtu. The JWPC also considered targeting, but favored shipping and the oil industry, which could more easily be attacked from bases in Australia. The staff of the USAAF accepted the importance of targeting shipping, but it was not what the B-29 was designed for. As for the oil industry, the oil refineries in the Dutch East Indies, primarily the ones at Palembang, could be attacked by B-29s based in India, staging through Ceylon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Matterhorn plan on 10 April 1944, but cut the force to just one wing of four groups. In recognition of the accelerated schedule for the capture of the Marianas, the second B-29 wing would be sent there instead, or to Australia if bases in the Marianas were not yet ready.

Command structure

To avoid the risk that B-29s might be wasted on the battlefields when they would be much more useful against the Japanese home islands, the Joint Chiefs approved the establishment in April 1944 of the Twentieth Air Force, setting the stage for Operation Matterhorn.

Arnold retained personal command of the Twentieth Air Force – to avoid diversion of assets from the B-29 effort against Japan, particularly by Admiral Nimitz, who was given command authority over all efforts in the Central Pacific – with Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell as chief of staff (and later commander of XXI Bomber Command). Tentative plans called for an operational force of 48 B-29 groups, numbering between 1,000 and 1,500 B-29s, to be deployed in four bomber commands (the XX BC of 4 groups in India-China, the XXI BC of 16 groups in the Marianas, the XXII BC of 24 groups in the Philippines and Okinawa, and the XXIII BC of 4 groups in the Aleutians).

Original plans for XX Bomber Command to employ two combat wings in China (the 58th and 73rd Combat Bomb Wings) were changed on 2 March 1944 when limited numbers of operational B-29s resulted in only the 58th CBW assigned. There, after poor bombing results, and as developing operations deemed the original complex organization unnecessary, it was deemed a redundant level of command and its four groups moved to Guam in April 1945 as part of XXI Bomber Command.

The bases in China were part of the China Burma India Theater of World War II for administrative purposes. The commander of the XX Bomber Command had no control over stations, bases, units, and personnel not directly assigned to him, and none over shipping and other logistic support essential to the operation. However the Commander-in-Chief of the XX Bomber Command reported directly to the JCS in Washington and was not under SEAC operational control like the rest of the personnel in the CBI. Acting as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs, Arnold named himself the Twentieth's commander, and the AAF Air Staff as also the Air Staff of the Twentieth Air Force. Brig. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell served as chief of staff and de facto commander of the Twentieth after Arnold suffered a heart attack in May. Centralized control of the Superfortresses from Washington marked the recognition of the B-29 as a strategic weapon that transcended theaters and services.

Accompanying them was Major General Kenneth B. Wolfe, the designated commander of the XX Bomber Command, which had been reassigned from the Second Air Force as the operational component of the Twentieth Air Force. Although a brilliant officer in research and development, with an excellent knowledge of the B-29, Wolfe had no upper echelon command or operational experience and was thus an unfortunate choice to command the first B-29 operations.

Base development

Advance echelons arrived in India in December 1943 to organize the building of airfields in India and China. Thousands of Indians labored to construct four permanent bases in eastern India around Kharagpur. As well as construction or modification of airfields in Bengal, a fuel pipeline to Calcutta and expansion of the port there was proposed. Meanwhile, 1,000 miles (1,600 km) to the northeast, across the Himalayan mountains, about 350,000 Chinese workers toiled to build four staging bases in western China near Chengtu (where Chennault had already developed airfields) and new airfields near Kunming.

The original plan envisioned two combat wings of 150 bombers each, but in April 1944 the second of those wings had not been sufficiently organized, equipped, or trained, and XX Bomber Command was reduced to a single bomb wing, fatally crippling its ability to sustain itself by airlift. By April 1944, the four B-29 groups of the 58th Bombardment Wing were available in Asia, and eight operating bases had become operational.

Campaign

That same month, the first Superfortresses arrived in India, having flown across the Atlantic Ocean using the South Atlantic Transport route from Morrison Field, Florida to Natal, Brazil then across to North Africa, then to Arabia, and Persia. The 58th Bomb Wing headquarters also arrived in India during the spring of 1944.

Wolfe launched the first B–29 Superfortress combat mission on June 5, 1944, against Japanese railroad facilities at Bangkok, Thailand, about 1,000 miles (1,600 km) away. Of the 98 bombers that took off from India, 77 hit their targets, dropping 368 tons of bombs. Encouraged by the results, XX Bomber Command prepared for the first raids against Japan.

Ten days later, sixty-eight Superfortresses took off at night from staging bases at Chengtu to bomb the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata on Kyūshū, more than 1,500 miles (2,400 km) away. The June 15, 1944, mission – the first raid on the Japanese home islands since the Doolittle raid of April 1942 – marked the beginning of the strategic bombardment campaign against Japan. Like the Doolittle attack, it achieved little physical destruction. Only forty-seven of the sixty-eight B–29s airborne hit the target area; four aborted with mechanical problems, four crashed, six jettisoned their bombs because of mechanical difficulties, and others bombed secondary targets or targets of opportunity. Only one B–29 was lost to enemy aircraft over the target, while another was strafed and destroyed by Japanese aircraft after making an emergency landing at Neihsiang.

The second full-scale strike did not occur until July 7, 1944. By then, Arnold, impatient with Wolfe's progress, had replaced him temporarily with Brigadier General LaVern G. Saunders, until Major General Curtis E. LeMay could arrive from Europe to assume permanent command. Unfortunately, the three-week delay between the first and second missions reflected serious problems that prevented a sustained strategic bombing campaign from China against Japan. Each B–29 mission consumed tremendous quantities of fuel and bombs, which had to be shuttled from India to the China bases over the Himalayas, the world's highest mountain range. For every Superfortress combat mission, the command flew an average of six B–29 round-trip cargo missions over the Hump, using both tactical aircraft and B-29s modified as fuel tankers. When it was immediately apparent that the operation would never be self-sustaining, the Air Transport Command was called upon to support Matterhorn with allocations on its Hump airlift, taken from the allocations to the Fourteenth Air Force already in China. In September 1944 70 C-109s were added to the effort, flown by surplus B-29 crews, but XX Bomber Command, fearful of diversions to other agencies, resisted all attempts to have them operated by ATC. Its transport procedures contradicted those of ATC, however, limiting its efficiency, and beginning in November 1944 its B-29s were withdrawn from the airlift and the C-109s transferred to ATC. With plans already developed to shut down B-29 forward basing in China at the end of January 1945, ATC took over the logistical supply of the bases in China, too late to provide the volume required to stockpile materiel. In the end, 42,000 tons of cargo were delivered over the Hump to XX Bomber Command between April 1944 and January 1945, nearly two-thirds of it by ATC.

Range presented another problem. Tokyo, in eastern Honshū, lay more than 2,000 miles (3,200 km) from the Chinese staging bases, out of reach of the B–29s. Kyūshū, in southwestern Japan, was the only one of the major home islands within the 1,600 miles (2,600 km) combat radius of the Superfortress. Targets in South East Asia also involved lengthy flights, with the Operation Boomerang raid which was conducted against Palembang on 10/11 August requiring a round trip of 3,855 miles (6,204 km).

The very heavy bomber still suffered mechanical problems that grounded some aircraft and forced others to turn back before dropping their bombs. Even those B–29s that reached the target area often had difficulty in hitting the objective, partly because of extensive cloud cover or high winds. Larger formations could have helped compensate for inaccurate bombing, but Saunders did not have enough B–29s to dispatch large formations. Also, the Twentieth Air Force periodically diverted the Superfortresses from strategic targets to support theater commanders in Southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific. For these reasons, the XX Bomber Command and the B–29s largely failed to fulfill their strategic promise.

On August 20, LeMay arrived to breathe new energy into the XX Bomber Command. The former Eighth Air Force group and wing commander had achieved remarkable success with strategic bombing operations in Europe, testing new concepts such as stagger formations, the combat box, and straight-and-level bombing runs. The youngest two-star general in the Army Air Forces had also revised tactics, tightened and expanded formations, and enhanced training for greater bombing precision. He inaugurated a lead-crew training school so that formations could learn to drop as a unit on cue from the aircraft designated as the lead ship.

During his first two months at XX Bomber Command, LeMay had little more success than Wolfe or Saunders. The command continued to average only about one sortie a month per aircraft against Japan's home islands. When Douglas MacArthur invaded the Philippines in October 1944, LeMay diverted his B-29s from bombing Japanese steel facilities to striking enemy aircraft factories and bases in Formosa, Kyūshū, and Manchuria.

Meanwhile, LeMay gained the support of Communist leader Mao Zedong, who controlled parts of northern China. Willing to help against a common enemy, Mao agreed to assist downed American airmen and to locate in northern China a weather station that would provide better forecasts for the XX Bomber Command's raids on the Japanese in Manchuria and Kyūshū. Hoping to gain American recognition of his own regime, Mao suggested that the Americans set up B–29 bases in northern China like those in Chiang Kai-shek's area of control in southern China. LeMay declined, however, because he found it difficult enough to supply the airfields at Chengtu.

Ichi-Go and the first "fire raid" of Hankow (Wuhan)

In late 1944, the Japanese offensive Operation Ichi-Go in China probed toward the B–29 and Air Transport Command bases around Chengdu and Kunming. To slow the enemy advance, Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault of the Fourteenth Air Force asked for raids on Japanese supplies at Hankow (an area now part of present-day Wuhan), and the Joint Chiefs directed LeMay to hit the city with firebombs. On December 18, LeMay launched the fire raid, sending eighty-four B–29s in at medium altitude with five hundred tons of incendiary bombs. The attack left Hankow burning for three days, proving the effectiveness of incendiary weapons against the predominantly wooden housing stock of the Far East.

By late 1944, American bombers were raiding Japan from the recently captured Marianas, making operations from the vulnerable and logistically impractical China bases unnecessary. In January 1945, the XX Bomber Command abandoned its bases in China and concentrated 58th Bomb Wing resources in India. The transfer signaled the end of Matterhorn. During the same month, LeMay moved to the Marianas, leaving command of the XX Bomber Command in India to Brig. Gen. Roger M. Ramey. Between January and March, Ramey's B–29s assisted Mountbatten in the South-East Asian theatre, supporting British and Indian ground forces in Burma by targeting rail and port facilities in Indochina, Thailand, and Burma. More distant targets included refineries and airfields in Singapore, Malaya, as well as Palembang and other locations in the Netherlands East Indies. The 58th, the only operational wing of the XX Bomber Command, remained in India until the end of March 1945, when it moved to the Marianas to join the XXI Bomber Command.

XX Bomber Command stopped being an operational command at the end of March 1945 when the 58th Bomb Wing moved from India to the Marianas and control of the wing passed to the XXI Bomber Command.

Combat missions

Assessment

The American Bomber Summary Survey states that "Approximately 800 tons of bombs were dropped by China-based B-29s on Japanese home island targets from June 1944 to January 1945. These raids were of insufficient weight and accuracy to produce significant results." XX Bomber Command had failed to achieve the strategic objectives that the planners had intended for Operation Matterhorn, largely because of logistical problems, the bomber's mechanical difficulties, the vulnerability of Chinese staging bases (see Operation Ichi-Go), and the extreme range required to reach key Japanese cities. Although the B–29s achieved some success when diverted to support Chiang Kai-shek's forces in China, MacArthur's offensives in the Philippines, and Mountbatten's efforts in the Burma Campaign, they generally accomplished little more than the B-17 Flying Fortresses and B-24 Liberators assigned to the Fourteenth, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Tenth Air Forces.

Chennault considered the Twentieth Air Force a liability and thought that its supplies of fuel and bombs could have been more profitably used by his Fourteenth Air Force. The XX Bomber Command consumed almost 15 percent of the Hump airlift tonnage per month during Matterhorn. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, who replaced Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell as American senior commander in the China theater, agreed with Chennault. The two were happy to see the B–29s leave China and India. Yet, despite those objections, Matterhorn did benefit the Allied effort. Using the China bases bolstered Chinese morale and, more important, it allowed the strategic bombing of Japan to begin six months before bases were available in the Marianas. The Matterhorn raids against the Japanese home islands also demonstrated the B–29's effectiveness against Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft artillery. Operations from the Marianas would profit from the streamlined organization and improved tactics developed on the Asian mainland.

Notes

1. Cate 1953, pp. 6–8.
2. "70 Years Ago: Remembering The Crash Of Boeing's Superfortress". KUOW. Retrieved 26 June 2023.
3. ^ Hayes 1982, pp. 496–497.
4. Cate 1953, pp. 9–13.
5. United States 1968, p. 687.
6. ^ Cate 1953, pp. 17–19.
7. ^ United States 1970, pp. 995–999.
8. Hayes 1982, pp. 493–495.
9. Hayes 1982, p. 497.
10. Cate 1953, pp. 20–21.
11. United States 1961, p. 172.
12. United States 1961, pp. 771–773.
13. Cate 1953, pp. 22–26.
14. Hayes 1982, pp. 500–501.
15. United States 1961, p. 780.
16. Hayes 1982, pp. 546–547.
17. ^ Hayes 1982, pp. 592–593.
18. Cate 1953, pp. 30–31.
19. Hayes 1982, pp. 554–560.
20. ^ Cate 1953, pp. 26–28.
21. ^ Cate 1953, pp. 29–31.
22. Ehrman, John (1956). Grand Strategy Volume V, August 1943-September 1944. London: HMSO (British official history). p. 453.
23. Maurer 1983, pp. 96–97, 318–319, 337–338, 343–344.
24. The 444th BG was based at Charra Airfield when it first arrived, but that base was not capable of sustaining very heavy bomber operations.
25. ^ Haulman, Chapter Over the Hump to Matterhorn p.5
26. Tillman, Barret (2010). Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942–1945. New York: Simon & Schuster. pp. 51–52. ISBN 978-1-84176-161-9.
27. Cate 1953, p. 102.
28. "The US Firebombing of Wuhan, Part 1". www.chinaww2.com. Retrieved 30 October 2022.
29. Mann 2004, pp. 113–114.
30. United States Strategic bombing survey summary report (Pacific War), Washington D.C. 1 July 1946. Page 16.

References

• Bell, Raymond E. Jr. (Fall 2014). "With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China during World War II". Army History (93): 30–54. ISSN 1546-5330. JSTOR 26300287.
• Cate, James (1953). "The Twentieth Air Force and Matterhorn". In Craven, Wesley Frank; Cate, James (eds.). The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 (PDF). The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. V. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Retrieved 26 June 2023.
• Haulman, Daniel L. (1999). Hitting Home: The Air Offensive Against Japan (PDF). The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II. Air Force History and Museums Program. OCLC 1101033871. Retrieved 3 July 2023.
• Hayes, Grace Person (1982). The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-0-87021-269-7. OCLC 7795125.
• Mann, Robert A. (2004). The B-29 Superfortress: A Comprehensive Registry of the Planes and Their Missions. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company. ISBN 0-7864-1787-0. OCLC 55962447.
• Maurer, Maurer (1983). Air Force Combat Units of World War II (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History. ISBN 0-912799-02-1. Retrieved 1 July 2023.
• Mays, Terry M. (2016). Matterhorn: The Operational History of the US XX Bomber Command from India and China: 1944-1945. Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Military. ISBN 978-0-7643-5074-0. OCLC 927401983.
• United States (1968). The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943. Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington, D. C.: US Government Printing Office. OCLC 213502760. Retrieved 1 July 2023.
• United States (1970). The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943. Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington, D. C.: US Government Printing Office. OCLC 213773675. Retrieved 1 July 2023.
• United States (1961). The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943. Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington, D. C.: US Government Printing Office. OCLC 394877. Retrieved 1 July 2023.

Attribution

• This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain: http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps51153/airforcehistory/usaaf/ww2/hittinghome/index.htm
  • Chapter 4: The Superfortress Takes to the Skies
  • Chapter 5: Over the Hump to Matterhorn

Further reading

• Cline, Ray S. (1990) . Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (PDF). United States Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 1-2.

External links

• https://web.archive.org/web/20050311211933/http://www.usaaf.net/ww2/hittinghome/hittinghomepg5.htm
• http://historynet.com/ahi/bloperationmatterhorn/index.html Archived 2006-05-26 at the Wayback Machine

v t e USAAF Twentieth Air Force in World War II
Airfields	China Hsinching Airfield (A-1) Kwanghan Airfield (A-3) Kuinglai Airfield (A-5) Pengshan Airfield (A-7) India Chakulia Airfield Dudhkundi Airfield Piardoba Airfield Kalaikunda Airfield Ceylon RAF China Bay Marianas Harmon Airfield (Guam) Isely Airfield (Saipan) North Airfield (Guam) North Airfield (Tinian) Northwest Airfield (Guam) West Airfield (Tinian)
Units	Commands VII Fighter XX Bomber XXI Bomber Wings 58th Bombardment 73d Bombardment 313th Bombardment 314th Bombardment 315th Bombardment 301st Fighter Groups Bombardment 6th Bombardment 9th Bombardment 16th Bombardment 19th Bombardment 29th Bombardment 39th Bombardment 40th Bombardment 330th Bombardment 331st Bombardment 444th Bombardment 462d Bombardment 468th Bombardment 497th Bombardment 498th Bombardment 499th Bombardment 500th Bombardment 501st Bombardment 502d Bombardment 504th Bombardment 505th Bombardment 509th Composite Fighter 15th Fighter 21st Fighter 413th Fighter 414th Fighter 506th Fighter 507th Fighter
United States Army Air Forces First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh Eighth Ninth Tenth Eleventh Twelfth Thirteenth Fourteenth Fifteenth Twentieth

• Japan campaign
• World War II strategic bombing conducted by the United States
• World War II aerial operations and battles of the Pacific theatre
• 1944 in Japan
• 1944 in the United States
• 1944 in Vietnam
• Attacks on military installations in the 1940s