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| ==Battle== | ==Battle== | ||
| However unbeknown to commander 1ATF—Brigadier Stuart Graham—the earlier attack on Phuoc Hai was in fact a deliberate attempt to provoke a reaction from the Australians. As such there would be no withdrawal, and anticipating that any relief force would move by road, the Viet Cong established an extensive ] in the buildings alongside Route 44, which led into the village. Although the presence of the ambush was not detected, the Australian |
However unbeknown to commander 1ATF—Brigadier Stuart Graham—the earlier attack on Phuoc Hai was in fact a deliberate attempt to provoke a reaction from the Australians. As such there would be no withdrawal, and anticipating that any relief force would move by road, the Viet Cong established an extensive ] in the buildings alongside Route 44, which led into the village. Although the presence of the ambush was not detected, the Australian APCs—under the command of Major Gordon Murphy—carrying C Company avoided it, inserting instead by a cross-country route.<ref name=Coulthard285/><ref name=Horner187>Horner 2008, p. 187.</ref> | ||
| After 1200 the first elements from A Company under Major Owen O’Brien began inserting by helicopter into an unsecured Landing Zone, and began the advance into the thick rainforest.<ref name=Coulthard285/> The Australians were soon contacted by heavy small arms fire, with a third of the lead platoon (5 Platoon) falling dead or wounded in the initial volleys. A Company subsequently broke contact and withdrew under heavy fire from what appeared to be an Viet Cong base area.<ref name=Horner187/> Unknown to the Australian’s the Viet Cong had now been reinforced by North Vietnamese regulars<ref name=Horner187/> and they now faced a ]-sized enemy in well prepared dug-in positions. Initially believing however that he only faced a ], the commanding officer of 6RAR—Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend—subsequently ordered a quick attack. <ref name=Coulthard285/> | After 1200 the first elements from A Company under Major Owen O’Brien began inserting by helicopter into an unsecured Landing Zone, and began the advance into the thick rainforest.<ref name=Coulthard285/> The Australians were soon contacted by heavy small arms fire, with a third of the lead platoon (5 Platoon) falling dead or wounded in the initial volleys. A Company subsequently broke contact and withdrew under heavy fire from what appeared to be an Viet Cong base area.<ref name=Horner187/> Unknown to the Australian’s the Viet Cong had now been reinforced by North Vietnamese regulars<ref name=Horner187/> and they now faced a ]-sized enemy in well prepared dug-in positions. Initially believing however that he only faced a ], the commanding officer of 6RAR—Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend—subsequently ordered a quick attack. <ref name=Coulthard285/> | ||
Revision as of 00:03, 1 July 2009
| Operation Bribie | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Vietnam War | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Australia |
 Viet Cong  North Vietnam | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Colin Townsend | Unknown | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| One infantry battalion | Unknown | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
|
8 killed 26 wounded | 50 to 70 killed | ||||||
Operation Bribie, or the Battle of Ap My An, was fought during the Vietnam War in Phyoc Tuy province on 17 February 1967 between Australian forces from the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and the Viet Cong, reinforced by North Vietnamese regulars. The battle was a hard fought affair and although significant casualties were inflicted on the insurgents the Australians were matched by a tenacious and disciplined force and were forced to withdraw overnight, before returning the next morning to find that the Viet Cong had also left the area. Indeed the vicious fighting at Ap My An was probably the closest the Australians came to defeat in a major battle during the war.
Prelude
At 0600 on 17 February two Viet Cong companies from D445 Battalion had occupied the coastal village of Phuoc Hai, in an attempt to engage South Vietnamese forces. Heavy fighting ensued, and after five hours the attacking force had withdrawn to the north-east. Believing the Viet Cong would attempt withdraw as they had during previous encounters, forces from the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) were subsequently inserted to block their withdrawal. The plan envisioned three companies from 6RAR landing by helicopter just north of the hamlet of Ap My An, and then linking up with the fourth company which would be inserted by M-113 Armoured Personnel Carriers from A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment. The battalion would then patrol westward.
Battle
However unbeknown to commander 1ATF—Brigadier Stuart Graham—the earlier attack on Phuoc Hai was in fact a deliberate attempt to provoke a reaction from the Australians. As such there would be no withdrawal, and anticipating that any relief force would move by road, the Viet Cong established an extensive ambush in the buildings alongside Route 44, which led into the village. Although the presence of the ambush was not detected, the Australian APCs—under the command of Major Gordon Murphy—carrying C Company avoided it, inserting instead by a cross-country route.
After 1200 the first elements from A Company under Major Owen O’Brien began inserting by helicopter into an unsecured Landing Zone, and began the advance into the thick rainforest. The Australians were soon contacted by heavy small arms fire, with a third of the lead platoon (5 Platoon) falling dead or wounded in the initial volleys. A Company subsequently broke contact and withdrew under heavy fire from what appeared to be an Viet Cong base area. Unknown to the Australian’s the Viet Cong had now been reinforced by North Vietnamese regulars and they now faced a battalion-sized enemy in well prepared dug-in positions. Initially believing however that he only faced a company, the commanding officer of 6RAR—Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend—subsequently ordered a quick attack.
Beginning at 1535 two companies were committed to the assault, which employed helicopters, communications, armoured mobility and artillery support. B Company was landed on the flank of the Viet Cong position and prepared to conduct the attack. C Company and D Company both moved to blocking positions, whilst A Company advanced and engaged the Viet Cong in fire support from a flank in an attempt to split their fire. From the outset, however, the lead elements came under constant sniper fire from the trees, and from machine guns that had not previously been detected. The assault soon faltered with steadily increasing casualties. A five hour close quarter battle ensued, and continued until night fell. The Australians assaulted the Viet Cong positions frontal tactics, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. During the fighting an APC was disabled by a recoilless rifle at close range, killing the driver.
Surrounded and receiving fire from all sides, the lead Australian elements were trapped and all attempts to regain momentum, including a bayonet charge by one platoon, also failed. The APCs had been used initially to secure the LZ at the jungle’s edge, however with the infantry in dire straits they were dispatched as a relief force. Fighting their way forward the APCs arrived by 1815 and began loading the most badly wounded. By 1850 the companies were able break contact and moved into a night harbour near the LZ. Heavy mortar and artillery fire, as well as airstrikes, covered the withdrawal and then pounded the battlefield during the evening.
Aftermath
After a tense night the Australians returned to the battlefield the following morning, only to find that the insurgents had also withdrawn, managing to avoided the pre-positioned blocking forces. During the sweep the bodies of the Australian dead from 5 Platoon were located and recovered, as was the burnt out APC. On the side the Viet Cong had written in blood: “DU ME UC DAI LOI”, loosely translated as “Aussies Get Stuffed”.
In the aftermath of the operation Hanoi claimed that the Viet Cong had won a decisive victory. The Australians, on the other hand, also claimed a significant triumph and this view was reflected by Brigadier Graham when he said that the VC "got a thrashing", a claim supported by the intelligence assessment of Viet Cong casualties. To be sure D445 Battalion was unable to mount a battalion-sized operation in Phuoc Tuy during the remainder of 1967. Regardless some of the Australian soldiers who had participated in the operation believed otherwise. Private Robin Harris of 5 Platoon later wrote: “I think that on this occasion Charlie’s losses were overstated. It was us who had copped a hiding.” This view was also shared by APC commander David Clifton when he recalled: “We had been soundly thrashed on Operation Bribie.”
The fighting had cost 6RAR seven killed and 26 wounded, whilst the cavalry also lost one man killed and an APC destroyed. Just eight Viet Cong bodies were recovered from the battlefield, although many more had obviously been removed. Later intelligence reports assessed their losses as between 50 and 70 killed. However despite the casualties inflicted the battle was no victory for the Australians who had also suffered very heavy casualties, and had been matched by their enemy in bravery and determination. Instead the battle was probably the closest the Australians came to defeat in a major battle in Vietnam with the Viet Cong had withstanding numerous Australian assaults as well as heavy artillery, mortar and aerial bombardment.
Notes
- ^ Coulthard-Clark 2008, p. 285.
- ^ Horner 2008, p. 187.
- ^ Horner 2008, p. 188.
- McNeill and Ekins, 2003, p. 106.
- McNeill and Ekins, 2003, p. 109.
- ^ Operation BRIBIE Victory or Defeat
- ^ Coulthard-Clark 2008, p. 286.
References
- Coulthard-Clark, Chris (2001). The Encyclopaedia of Australia's Battles (Second ed.). Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin. ISBN 1865086347.
- Horner (ed), David (2008). Duty First: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment. Second Edition. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 9781741753745.
{{cite book}}:|last=has generic name (help) - McNeill, Ian (2003). On the Offensive: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1967–1968. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1863733043.
{{cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) (help)
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