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{{Short description|Relation each thing bears to itself alone}}
NOTE: text removed from this article which explains what the article is about and why you should care is now located ]
{{Other uses of |Identity}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2020}}
In ], '''identity''' (from {{Langx|la|links=no|]}}, "'''sameness'''") is the ] each thing bears only to itself.<ref>''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'': , First published Wed 15 Dec 2004; substantive revision Sun 1 Oct 2006.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTCD-2 |chapter=identity|year=1999 }}</ref> The notion of identity gives rise to ], including the ] (if ''x'' and ''y'' share all their properties, are they one and the same thing?), and questions about change and ] over time (what has to be the case for a person ''x'' at one time and a person ''y'' at a later time to be one and the same person?). It is important to distinguish between ''qualitative identity'' and ''numerical identity''. For example, consider two children with identical bicycles engaged in a race while their mother is watching. The two children have the ''same'' bicycle in one sense (''qualitative identity'') and the ''same'' mother in another sense (''numerical identity'').<ref name="Sandkühler2">{{cite book |last1=Sandkühler |first1=Hans Jörg |title=Enzyklopädie Philosophie |date=2010 |publisher=Meiner |url=https://meiner.de/enzyklopadie-philosophie.html |chapter=Ontologie: 4 Aktuelle Debatten und Gesamtentwürfe |language=German |access-date=14 January 2021 |archive-date=11 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210311040207/https://meiner.de/enzyklopadie-philosophie.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> This article is mainly concerned with ''numerical identity'', which is the stricter notion.


The philosophical concept of identity is distinct from the better-known notion of identity in use in ] and the ]s. The philosophical concept concerns a ], specifically, a relation that ''x'' and ''y'' stand in ] they are one and the same thing, or ''identical to'' each other (i.e. if, and only if ''x'' = ''y''). The ], by contrast, has to do with a person's self-conception, social presentation, and more generally, the aspects of a person that make them unique, or qualitatively different from others (e.g. ], ], ], ], and processes of ]). Lately, identity has been conceptualized considering humans’ position within the ecological web of life; this combination of sociocultural and ecological identification is known as ecocultural identity.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Milstein |first1=T. |last2=Castro-Sotomayor |first2=J. |editor-first1=Tema |editor-first2=José |editor-last1=Milstein |editor-last2=Castro-Sotomayor |title=Routledge Handbook of Ecocultural Identity |publisher=Routledge |location=London |doi=10.4324/9781351068840 |date=1 May 2020|isbn=9781351068840 |s2cid=229580440 |url=https://eprints.utas.edu.au/35626/1/Empathetic%20Ecocultural%20Positionality%20and%20the%20Forest%20Other%20in%20Tasmanian%20Forestry%20Conflicts.docx }}</ref>
In ], '''identity''', from {{Lang-la|identitas}} (“sameness”), is the exact '''sameness''' of things. According to ] two things sharing every ] are not only ], but are the same thing. The concept of sameness has given rise to the general concept of ], as in ] and ].

An ] can only be fully '''identical''' with itself. Any ] gives rise to a separate identity. Thus identity is whatever makes an entity definable and recognizable, in terms of possessing a set of qualities or characteristics that distinguish it from other entities.<ref>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: , First published Wed Dec 15, 2004; substantive revision Sun Oct 1, 2006. </ref><ref>T. Thompson (ed.) and S. M. Black (ed.) (2006), Forensic Human Identification: An Introduction. CRC Press. ISBN 0849339545</ref> In ]'s terms, identity is whatever makes something the ] or ].<ref> This includes ] that either yields a yes or no value for whether a thing is present in a field of observation, or that distinguishes the thing from its background, allowing one to determine what is and what is not included in it. Also see ].</ref>

==Logic of identity==
In ], the ] (also called "equality") is normally defined as the ] that holds ''only'' between a thing and itself. That is, identity is the two-place ], "=", such that for all ''x'' and ''y'', "''x''&nbsp;=&nbsp;''y''" is ] ] ''x'' is the same thing as ''y''. Identity is ], ], and ]. It is an ] of most normal ]s that for all ''x'' and ''y'', if ''x''&nbsp;=&nbsp;''y'' then necessarily ''y''&nbsp;=&nbsp;''x''. That is, identity does not hold contingently, but of necessity.

Put in these terms (above), it can seem rather trivial, but the point, of course, is that the same number, object, or person, can have different "guises", and it is far from trivial if two or more guises refer to the same same number, object, or person. For example, 1+1=2 because '1+1' and '2' are different "guises" for the same number. Similarly, for personal identity over time, "me today" and "me yesterday" are different guises for the same person.


==Metaphysics of identity==<!-- This section is linked from ] --> ==Metaphysics of identity==<!-- This section is linked from ] -->
{{more citations needed section|date=July 2012}}
Metaphysicians, and sometimes philosophers of language and mind, ask other questions: Metaphysicians and philosophers of language and mind ask other questions:
* What does it mean for an object to be the same as itself? * What does it mean for an object to be the same as itself?
* If x and y are identical (are the same thing), must they always be identical? Are they ''necessarily'' identical? * If x and y are identical (are the same thing), must they always be identical? Are they ''necessarily'' identical?
* What does it mean for an object to be the same, if it ]s over time? (Is apple<SUB>''t''</SUB> the same as apple<SUB>''t''+1</SUB>?) * What does it mean for an object to be the same, if it changes over time? (Is apple<SUB>''t''</SUB> the same as apple<SUB>''t''+1</SUB>?)
* If an object's parts are entirely replaced over time, as in the ] example, in what way is it the same? * If an object's parts are entirely replaced over time, as in the ] example, in what way is it the same?
The ] originates from ]. The modern formulation of identity is that of ], who held that ''x'' is the same as ''y'' ] every ] true of ''x'' is true of ''y'' as well. The ] originates from ]. The modern formulation of identity is that of ], who held that ''x'' is the same as ''y'' ] every ] true of ''x'' is true of ''y'' as well.


Leibniz's ideas have taken root in the ], where they have influenced the development of the ] as ]. Mathematicians sometimes distinguish identity from ]. More mundanely, an ''identity'' in ] may be an '']'' that holds true for all values of a ]. ] argued that things are inherently self-contradictory and that the notion of something being self-identical only made sense if it were not also not-identical or different from itself and did not also imply the latter. In ]'s words, "Identity is the identity of identity and non-identity." More recent metaphysicians have discussed ] -- the notion that there can be the same object in different possible worlds. An alternative to trans-world identity is the counterpart relation in ]. It is a similarity relation that rejects trans-world individuals and instead defends an objects counterpart - the most similar object. Leibniz's ideas have taken root in the ], where they have influenced the development of the ] as ]. Mathematicians sometimes distinguish identity from ]. More mundanely, an ''identity'' in ] may be an '']'' that holds true for all values of a ]. ] argued that things are inherently self-contradictory<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Siemens|first=Reynold L.|date=1988|title=Hegel and the Law of Identity|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20128696|journal=The Review of Metaphysics|volume=42|issue=1|pages=103–127|jstor=20128696|issn=0034-6632}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bole|first=Thomas J.|date=1987|title=Contradiction in Hegel's "Science of Logic"|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20128487|journal=The Review of Metaphysics|volume=40|issue=3|pages=515–534|jstor=20128487|issn=0034-6632}}</ref> and that the notion of something being self-identical only made sense if it were not also not-identical or different from itself and did not also imply the latter. In ]'s words, "Identity is the identity of identity and non-identity." More recent metaphysicians have discussed ]—the notion that there can be the same object in different possible worlds. An alternative to trans-world identity is the counterpart relation in ]. It is a similarity relation that rejects trans-world individuals and instead defends an object's counterpart{{mdash}}the most similar object.


Some philosophers have denied that there is such a relation as identity. Thus ] writes ('']'' 5.5301): "That identity is not a relation between objects is obvious." At 5.5303 he elaborates: "Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing." ] had earlier voiced a worry that seems to be motivating Wittgenstein's point ('']'' §64): "dentity, an objector may urge, cannot be anything at all: two terms plainly are not identical, and one term cannot be, for what is it identical with?" Even before Russell, ], at the beginning of "]," expressed a worry with regard to identity as a relation: "Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation?" More recently, ]<ref>C.J.F. Williams, ''What is identity?'', Oxford University Press 1989. {{page missing|date=September 2022}}</ref> has suggested that identity should be viewed as a second-order relation, rather than a relation between objects, and ]<ref>Kai F. Wehmeier, "How to live without identity—and why," ''Australasian Journal of Philosophy'' 90:4, 2012, pp. 761–777.</ref> has argued that appealing to a binary relation that every object bears to itself, and to no others, is both logically unnecessary and metaphysically suspect.
==Qualitative versus numerical identity==
Arbitrary objects ''a'' and ''b'' can be said to be ''qualitatively'' identical if ''a'' and ''b'' are duplicates, that is, if ''a'' and ''b'' are exactly similar in all respects, that is, if ''a'' and ''b'' have all ] in common. Examples of this might be two wine glasses made in the same wine glass factory on the same production line (at least, for a relaxed standard of exact similarity), or a carbon atom in one's left hand and a carbon atom in one's right shoulder.


==Identity statements==
Alternatively, ''a'' and ''b'' can be said to be ''numerically'' identical if ''a'' and ''b'' are one and the same thing, that is, if ''a'' is ''b'', that is, if there is only one thing variously called "''a''" and "''b''". For example, ] is numerically identical with ] in the sense that there is only one person (who happens to wear different clothes at different times). This relationship is expressed in mathematics with the "=" symbol, e.g., ''a'' = ''b'', or Clark Kent = Superman.
Kind-terms, or ]s<ref>Theodore Sider. . ''Philosophical Books'' '''41''' (2000): 81–89.</ref> give a criterion of identity and non-identity among items of their kind.


==External references== == See also ==
* ]
;General Information
* ]
⚫ *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: , First published Wed Dec 15, 2004; substantive revision Sun Oct 1, 2006.
* ]
⚫ *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: . First published Fri 18 March 2005.
* ]/]
⚫ *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: . First published Tue Aug 20, 2002; substantive revision Tue Feb 20, 2007.
* ]
⚫ *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: . First published Mon 22 April 2002.
* ]
* . youtube.com.
* ]
* ]


==Notes==
;Citations
{{Reflist}}
<references/>


==References==
;Books and publications
* {{aut|Gallois, A.}} 1998: ''Occasions of identity''. Oxford: Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-823744-8}}
* Andrew Bowie, . Routledge. Page 55-90. ISBN 0415103460
* {{aut|Parfit, D.}} 1984: ''Reasons and persons''. Oxford: Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-824908-X}}
* James, W., & Perry, R. B. (2006). . New York: Longmans, Green, and co. Page 134, 197, 202. ()
* {{aut|Robinson, D.}} 1985: Can amoebae divide without multiplying? ''Australasian journal of philosophy'', '''63'''(3): 299–319. {{doi|10.1080/00048408512341901}}
* MacVannel, J. A. (1967). . New York: AMS Press.
* {{aut|Sidelle, A.}} 2000: . ''Philosophical review'', '''109'''(3): 469–471.
* Hegel, G. W. F., & Sterrett, J. M. (1893). ; translated selections from his "Rechtsphilosophie,". Boston: Ginn and Co.
* {{aut|Sider, T.}} 2001: . ''British journal for the philosophy science'', '''52'''(2): 401–405. {{doi|10.1093/bjps/52.2.401}}
* Baldwin, J. M. (1913). ; a sketch and an interpretation. A history of the sciences. New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
* Dessoir, M. (1912). . New York: The Macmillan company.
* Shaw, C. G. (1908). . London: S. Sonnenschein.
*Alexander, A. B. D. (1907). . Glasgow: J. Maclehose and Sons.
* MacVannel, J. A. (1905). . New York: Teachers college, Columbia University.
* Schade, A., & Rocholl, R. (1899). . Cleveland, O.: A. Schade. Page 140 - 142.
* Külpe, O. (1897). : a handbook for students of psychology, logic, ethics, æsthetics and general philosophy. London: S. Sonnenschein.
* Courtney, W. L. (1895). . London: Chapman and Hall.
* Manning, Jacob Merrill (1872). . Oxford University.
* Paksoy, H.B. (2001) Florence: European University/Carrie.


==See also== ==External links==
⚫ *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: , First published Wed 15 Dec 2004; substantive revision Sun 1 Oct 2006.
;People: ], ], ], ], ]
⚫ *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: . First published Fri 18 March 2005.
;General: ], ], ], ], ]
⚫ *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: . First published Tue 20 Aug 2002; substantive revision Tue 20 Feb 2007.
;Identity:], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ]
⚫ *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: . First published Mon 22 April 2002.
*], Mariela Michel, ''''.


{{metaphysics}} {{metaphysics}}
{{philosophy of mind}} {{philosophy of mind}}
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Latest revision as of 21:59, 29 December 2024

Relation each thing bears to itself alone For other uses of "Identity", see Identity (disambiguation).

In metaphysics, identity (from Latin: identitas, "sameness") is the relation each thing bears only to itself. The notion of identity gives rise to many philosophical problems, including the identity of indiscernibles (if x and y share all their properties, are they one and the same thing?), and questions about change and personal identity over time (what has to be the case for a person x at one time and a person y at a later time to be one and the same person?). It is important to distinguish between qualitative identity and numerical identity. For example, consider two children with identical bicycles engaged in a race while their mother is watching. The two children have the same bicycle in one sense (qualitative identity) and the same mother in another sense (numerical identity). This article is mainly concerned with numerical identity, which is the stricter notion.

The philosophical concept of identity is distinct from the better-known notion of identity in use in psychology and the social sciences. The philosophical concept concerns a relation, specifically, a relation that x and y stand in if, and only if they are one and the same thing, or identical to each other (i.e. if, and only if x = y). The sociological notion of identity, by contrast, has to do with a person's self-conception, social presentation, and more generally, the aspects of a person that make them unique, or qualitatively different from others (e.g. cultural identity, gender identity, national identity, online identity, and processes of identity formation). Lately, identity has been conceptualized considering humans’ position within the ecological web of life; this combination of sociocultural and ecological identification is known as ecocultural identity.

Metaphysics of identity

This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2012) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

Metaphysicians and philosophers of language and mind ask other questions:

  • What does it mean for an object to be the same as itself?
  • If x and y are identical (are the same thing), must they always be identical? Are they necessarily identical?
  • What does it mean for an object to be the same, if it changes over time? (Is applet the same as applet+1?)
  • If an object's parts are entirely replaced over time, as in the Ship of Theseus example, in what way is it the same?

The law of identity originates from classical antiquity. The modern formulation of identity is that of Gottfried Leibniz, who held that x is the same as y if and only if every predicate true of x is true of y as well.

Leibniz's ideas have taken root in the philosophy of mathematics, where they have influenced the development of the predicate calculus as Leibniz's law. Mathematicians sometimes distinguish identity from equality. More mundanely, an identity in mathematics may be an equation that holds true for all values of a variable. Hegel argued that things are inherently self-contradictory and that the notion of something being self-identical only made sense if it were not also not-identical or different from itself and did not also imply the latter. In Hegel's words, "Identity is the identity of identity and non-identity." More recent metaphysicians have discussed trans-world identity—the notion that there can be the same object in different possible worlds. An alternative to trans-world identity is the counterpart relation in counterpart theory. It is a similarity relation that rejects trans-world individuals and instead defends an object's counterpart—the most similar object.

Some philosophers have denied that there is such a relation as identity. Thus Ludwig Wittgenstein writes (Tractatus 5.5301): "That identity is not a relation between objects is obvious." At 5.5303 he elaborates: "Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing." Bertrand Russell had earlier voiced a worry that seems to be motivating Wittgenstein's point (The Principles of Mathematics §64): "dentity, an objector may urge, cannot be anything at all: two terms plainly are not identical, and one term cannot be, for what is it identical with?" Even before Russell, Gottlob Frege, at the beginning of "On Sense and Reference," expressed a worry with regard to identity as a relation: "Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation?" More recently, C. J. F. Williams has suggested that identity should be viewed as a second-order relation, rather than a relation between objects, and Kai Wehmeier has argued that appealing to a binary relation that every object bears to itself, and to no others, is both logically unnecessary and metaphysically suspect.

Identity statements

Kind-terms, or sortals give a criterion of identity and non-identity among items of their kind.

See also

Notes

  1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Identity", First published Wed 15 Dec 2004; substantive revision Sun 1 Oct 2006.
  2. Audi, Robert (1999). "identity". The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
  3. Sandkühler, Hans Jörg (2010). "Ontologie: 4 Aktuelle Debatten und Gesamtentwürfe". Enzyklopädie Philosophie (in German). Meiner. Archived from the original on 11 March 2021. Retrieved 14 January 2021.
  4. Milstein, T.; Castro-Sotomayor, J. (1 May 2020). Milstein, Tema; Castro-Sotomayor, José (eds.). Routledge Handbook of Ecocultural Identity. London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781351068840. ISBN 9781351068840. S2CID 229580440.
  5. Siemens, Reynold L. (1988). "Hegel and the Law of Identity". The Review of Metaphysics. 42 (1): 103–127. ISSN 0034-6632. JSTOR 20128696.
  6. Bole, Thomas J. (1987). "Contradiction in Hegel's "Science of Logic"". The Review of Metaphysics. 40 (3): 515–534. ISSN 0034-6632. JSTOR 20128487.
  7. C.J.F. Williams, What is identity?, Oxford University Press 1989.
  8. Kai F. Wehmeier, "How to live without identity—and why," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90:4, 2012, pp. 761–777.
  9. Theodore Sider. "Recent work on identity over time". Philosophical Books 41 (2000): 81–89.

References

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