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Conscription
1780 caricature of a press gang
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v t e

Conscription (alias press-ganging, crimping, impressment, blood-tax, call-up, and draft) is a general term for any forced labor imposed by a regime on a part of its population, but it is frequently associated with obligatory military service.

Obligatory military service, in countries where it is in force, is normally only imposed on male citizens, with there being countries where conscription applies to both genders, although there is not always allowance for women in the armed forces. There is a minimum and maximum age at which conscription occurs, which varies from country to country. The law often spells out reasons for avoiding or deferring conscription: illness or other physical defects, certain family circumstances, specific job (i.e. state shortage of relevant employees), training in specific institutions, etc., are usually not subject to conscription as well as people who were sentenced to imprisonment. Furthermore, in many states the military service may be replaced by so-called alternative service for those who do not agree to serve in the army, based on religious, moral or other reasons (the law may limit the range of such considerations, but also require some evidence of their presence), and the length of alternative service is usually longer than the term of obligatory military service. In some states, conscripts can buy themselves off the official enrollment, paying a sum of money to the State, and pay bribes to officials involved in the decision about whether to send a man to war. It should also be noted that even in states with very large number of troops on military duty, much of the armed forces consists of people who voluntarily chose the military profession. Some countries, however, practice selective compulsory military service or voluntary military service.

Conscription finds its origin in antiquity, which made frequent use of it. Following on from the mercenary armies used until the end of the 18th century and preceding the professional army, modern conscription has been principally developed by the French Revolution, with the famous levée en masse (22 September 1793 to 21 September 1794), organized next by Jourdan law.

At the beginning of the 21st century, most occidental States have put an end to conscription. Among them Norway, Switzerland, Finland, Austria and Germany have conserved the system.

Conscription was primarily used for defense. Today, many countries have national service, having chosen to retain this even in peacetime for non-military reasons, such as cultural and political reasons. Among the arguments for conscription mentioned is that it can homogenize the mentality of the population and thus maintain social stability, which could not be achieved if too many were individualists and had their own opinions, and to create diversity in the Armed Forces recruitment. There is a claim that conscription contributes greatly to the state, promoting values such as patriotism and mutual responsibility among civilian recruits. In the debate over conscription, many argue that there is militarization of civil society and creation of a macho and violent society - when the neglected social principles are less important. Topics such as education, health, welfare, crime, etc. are given less manpower and less attention.

In countries with conscription, there is imprisonment and sometimes even capital punishment or corporal punishment for evading military service. Several civil rights groups in different countries have condemned conscription.

History

Conscription has historically been a more or less uniquely Caucasian practice. Through colonialism and globalism however, this practice has become universal. By the mid-20th century, all countries of the world (save a few small ones) practiced conscription. Some countries have nevertheless since abolished conscription. For the most part, conscription has been a given for young men throughout European and Middle Eastern history. Some countries have introduced the option of undergoing an alternative noncombatant service instead.

Historical examples of conscription:

Ilkum

Around the reign of Hammurabi (1792-1750 BC), the Babylonian Empire used a system of conscription called Ilkum. Under the system those eligible were required to serve in the royal army in time of war. During times of peace they were instead required to provide labour for other activities of the state. In return for this service, those subject to it gained the right to hold land. It is possible that this right was not to hold land per se but specific land supplied by the state.

Various forms of avoiding military service are recorded. While it was outlawed by the Code of Hammurabi, the hiring of substitutes appears to have been practiced both before and after the creation of the code. Later records show that Ilkum commitments could become regularly traded. In other places, people simply left their towns to avoid their Ilkum service. Another option was to sell Ilkum lands and the commitments along with them. With the exception of a few exempted classes, this was forbidden by the Code of Hammurabi.

Medieval levies

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Under the feudal conditions for holding land in the medieval period, most peasants and freemen were liable to provide one man of suitable age per family for military duty when required by either the king or the local lord. Those who refused became outlaws. The levies raised in this way fought as infantry under local superiors. This was essentially an early form of conscription. Although the exact laws varied greatly depending on the country and the period, generally these levies were only obliged to fight for one to three months. Most were subsistence farmers, and it was in everyone's interest to send the men home for harvest-time.

In medieval Scandinavia the 'leiðangr' (Old Norse), 'leidang' (Norwegian), 'leding', (Danish), 'ledung' (Swedish), 'expeditio' (Latin) or sometimes 'lething' (Old English), was a levy of free farmers conscripted into coastal fleets for seasonal excursions and in defence of the realm.

The bulk of the Anglo-Saxon English army, called the fyrd, was composed of part-time English soldiers drawn from the landowning minor nobility. These thegns were the land-holding aristocracy of the time and were required to serve with their own armour and weapons for a certain number of days each year. The historian David Sturdy has cautioned about regarding the fyrd as a precursor to a modern national army composed of all ranks of society, describing it as a "ridiculous fantasy":

The persistent old belief that peasants and small farmers gathered to form a national army or fyrd is a strange delusion dreamt up by antiquarians in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries to justify universal military conscription.

Captive armies

The system of captive armies was widely used in the Middle East, beginning with the Egyptians training Mamluks from the 9th century, to the Turks and Ottoman Empire through the 19th century.

In the middle of the 14th century, Ottoman Sultan Murad I developed personal troops to be loyal to him, with a captive army called the Kapıkulu. The new force was built by kidnapping Christian children, especially from the far areas of his empire, in a system known as the devşirme (translated "blood tax" or "child collection"). The captive children were persuaded to convert to Islam. The Sultans had the young boys trained over several years. Those who showed special promise in fighting skills were trained in advanced warrior skills, put into the sultan's personal service, and turned into the Janissaries, the elite branch of the Kapıkulu. Most of the military commanders of the Ottoman forces, imperial administrators and upper-level officials of the Ottoman Empire, such as Pargalı İbrahim Pasha and Sokollu Mehmet Paşa, were recruited in this way. By 1609 the Sultan's Kapıkulu forces increased to about 100,000. As European Christian states increased in military power, they were able to stem and eventually repel most of the Islamic riazzas (invasions) into the European heartland.

The Sultan began turning to the Barbary Pirates. Their attacks on ships off the coast of Africa or in the Mediterranean, and capture of people for ransom or sale provided some captives for the Sultan's system. Eventually the Sultan turned to foreign volunteers from the warrior clans of Circassians in southern Russia to fill his Janissary armies. As a whole the system began to break down. The loyalty of the Jannissaries became increasingly suspect. Mahmud II forcibly disbanded the Janissary corps in 1826.

Similar to the Janissaries in origin and means of development were the Mamluks of Egypt in the Middle Ages. The Mamluks were usually captive non-Muslim Iranian and Turkish children who had been kidnapped or bought as captives from the Barbary coasts. The Egyptians assimilated and trained the boys and young men to become Islamic soldiers who served the Muslim caliphs and the Ayyubid sultans during the Middle Ages. The first mamluks served the Abbasid caliphs in 9th century Baghdad. Over time they became a powerful military caste. On more than one occasion, they seized power, for example, ruling Egypt from 1250–1517.

From 1250 Egypt had been ruled by the Bahri dynasty of Kipchak origin. Slaves from the Caucasus served in the army and formed an elite corp of troops. They eventually revolted in Egypt to form the Burgi dynasty. The Mamluks' excellent fighting abilities, massed Islamic armies, and overwhelming numbers succeeded in overcoming the Christian Crusader fortresses in the Holy Land. The Mamluks were the most successful defense against the Mongol Ilkhanate of Persia and Iraq from entering Egypt.

On the western coast of Africa, Berber Muslims captured non-Muslims to put to work as laborers. They generally converted the younger people to Islam and many became quite assimilated. In Morocco, the Berber looked south rather than north. The Moroccan Sultan Moulay Ismail, called "the Bloodthirsty" (1672–1727), employed a corps of 150,000 black slaves, called his Black Guard. He used them to coerce the country into submission.

Invention of modern conscription

Modern conscription, the massed military enlistment of national citizens (today recognized in the USA as "the draft"), was devised during the French Revolution, to enable the Republic to defend itself from the attacks of European monarchies. Deputy Jean-Baptiste Jourdan gave its name to the September 5, 1798 Act, whose first article stated: "Any Frenchman is a soldier and owes himself to the defense of the nation." It enabled the creation of the Grande Armée, what Napoleon Bonaparte called "the nation in arms," which overwhelmed European professional armies that often numbered only into the low tens of thousands. More than 2.6 million men were inducted into the French military in this way between the years 1800 and 1813.

The defeat of the Prussian Army in particular shocked the Prussian establishment, which had believed it was invincible after the victories of Frederician. The Prussians were used to relying on superior organization and tactical factors such as order of battle to focus superior troops against inferior ones. Given approximately equivalent forces, as was generally the case with professional armies, these factors showed considerable importance. However, they became considerably less important when the Prussian armies faced forces that outnumbered their own in some cases by more than ten to one. Scharnhorst advocated adopting the levée en masse, the military conscription used by France. The Krümpersystem was the beginning of short-term compulsory service in Prussia, as opposed to the long-term conscription previously used.

In the Russian Empire, the military service time "owed" by serfs was 25 years at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1834 it was decreased to 20 years. The recruits were to be not younger than 17 and not older than 35. In 1874 Russia introduced universal conscription in the modern pattern, an innovation only made possible by the abolition of serfdom in 1861. New military law decreed that all male Russian subjects, when they reached the age of 20, were eligible to serve in the military for six years.

United States

Colonial and Early National

Colonial militia laws—and after independence those of the United States and the various states—required able-bodied males to enroll in the militia, to undergo a minimum of military training, and to serve for limited periods of time in war or emergency. This earliest form of conscription involved selective drafts of militiamen for service in particular campaigns. Following this system in its essentials, the Continental Congress in 1778 recommended that the states draft men from their militias for one year's service in the Continental army; this first national conscription was irregularly applied and failed to fill the Continental ranks. In 1814, President James Madison proposed conscription of 40,000 men for the army, but the War of 1812 ended before Congress took any action.

Civil War

Although both North and South resorted to conscription during the Civil War, in neither nation did the system work effectively. The Confederate congress on Apr. 16, 1862, passed an act requiring military service for three years from all males aged eighteen to thirty-five not legally exempt, and it later extended the obligation. The U.S. Congress followed on July 17, 1862, with an act authorizing a militia draft within a state when it could not meet its quota with volunteers. This state-administered system failed in practice and on Mar. 3, 1863, Congress passed the first genuine national conscription law, setting up under the Union army an elaborate machinery for enrolling and drafting men between twenty and forty-five years of age. Quotas were assigned in each state, the deficiencies in volunteers to be met by conscription. But men drafted could provide substitutes or, until mid-1864, avoid service by paying commutation money. Many eligibles pooled their money to cover the cost of anyone drafted. Families used the substitute provision to select which man should go into the army and which should stay home. There was much evasion and overt resistance to the draft, especially in Catholic areas. The great draft riot in New York City in July 1863 involved Irish immigrants who had been signed up as citizens to swell the machine vote, not realizing it made them liable for the draft. Of the 168,649 men procured for the Union through the draft, 117,986 were substitutes, leaving only 50,663 who had their personal services conscripted.

The problem of Confederate desertion was aggravated by the inequitable inclinations of conscription officers and local judges. The three conscription acts of the Confederacy exempted certain categories, most notably the planter class, and enrolling officers and local judges often practiced favoritism, sometimes accepting bribes. Attempts to effectively deal with the issue were frustrated by conflict between state and local governments on the one hand and the national government of the Confederacy.

Recent

On July 15, 2010, Congressman Charles B. Rangel, a war veteran, introduced H.R. 5741 which if passed would "To require all persons in the United States between the ages of 18 and 42 to perform national service, either as a member of the uniformed services or in civilian service in furtherance of the national defense and homeland security."

Conscription of women

Conscription is normally only imposed on men. A few countries however impose conscription on both men and women. As of 2010, these countries include Benin, Chad, China,, Cuba, Egypt, Eritrea, Israel, Libya, Malaysia, North Korea, Peru, Taiwan, Tunisia,, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mongolia. In the United Kingdom during World War II, beginning in 1941, women were brought into the scope of conscription but, as all women with dependent children were exempt and many women were informally left in occupations such as nursing or teaching, the number conscripted was relatively few.. In the USSR, there was no systematic conscription of women for the armed forces, but the severe disruption of normal life and the high proportion of civilians affected by World War II after the German invasion attracted many volunteers for what was termed "The Great Patriotic War". Medical doctors of both genders could and would be conscripted (as officers). Also, the free Soviet university education system required Department of Chemistry students of both sexes to complete an ROTC course in NBC defense, and such female reservist officers could be conscripted in times of war. The United States came close to drafting women into the Nurse Corps in preparation for a planned invasion of Japan.

In 1981 in the United States, several men filed lawsuit in the case Rostker v. Goldberg, alleging that the Selective Service Act of 1948 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by only requiring that men register with the Selective Service System (SSS). The Supreme Court eventually upheld the Act, stating that "the argument for registering women was based on considerations of equity, but Congress was entitled, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, to focus on the question of military need, rather than 'equity.'"

On October 1, 1999 in the Taiwan Area, the Judicial Yuan of the Republic of China in its Interpretation 490 considered that the physical differences between males and females and the derived role differentiation in their respective social functions and lives would not make drafting males only violating the Constitution of the Republic of China. Though women are conscripted in Taiwan, transsexual persons are exempt.

Conscientious objection

A conscientious objector is an individual whose personal beliefs are incompatible with military service, or sometimes with any role in the armed forces. In some countries, conscientious objectors have special legal status, which augments their conscription duties. For example, Sweden allows conscientious objectors to choose a service in the "weapons-free" branch, such as an airport fireman, nurse or telecommunications technician. Some may also refuse such service as they feel that they still are a part of the military complex. Some conscientious objectors are so for religious reasons — notably, the members of the historic peace churches are pacifist by doctrine, and Jehovah's Witnesses, while not strictly speaking pacifists, refuse to participate in the armed services on the grounds that they believe Christians should be neutral in worldly conflicts.

Evasion of conscription

Template:Globalize/USA

Historically, there has been resistance to conscription in almost every country and situation where it has been imposed. The New York Draft Riots (July 11 to July 16, 1863; known at the time as Draft Week), were violent disturbances in New York City that were the culmination of discontent with new laws passed by Congress to draft men to fight in the ongoing American Civil War. The Central Asian Revolt started in the summer of 1916, when the Russian Empire government ended its exemption of Muslims from military service.

In the USA and some other countries, the Vietnam War saw new levels of opposition to conscription and the Selective Service System. Many people opposed to and facing conscription chose to either apply for classification and assignment to civilian alternative service or noncombatant service within the military as conscientious objectors, or to evade the draft by fleeing to a neutral country. A small proportion, like Muhammad Ali, chose to resist the draft by publicly and politically fighting conscription. Some people resist at the point of registration for the draft. In the USA since 1980, for example, the draft resistance movement has focused on mandatory draft registration. Others resist at the point of induction, when they are ordered to put on a uniform, when they are ordered to carry or use a weapon, or when they are ordered into combat.

In the United States, especially during the Vietnam Era, some used political connections to ensure that they were placed well away from any potential harm, serving in what was termed a Champagne unit. Many would avoid military service altogether through college deferments, by becoming fathers, or serving in various exempt jobs (teaching was one possibility). Others used educational exemptions, became conscientious objectors or pretended to be conscientious objectors, although they might then be drafted for non-combat work, such as serving as a combat medic. It was also possible they could be asked to do similar civilian work, such as being a hospital orderly.

It was, in fact, quite easy for those with some knowledge of the system to avoid being drafted. A simple route, widely publicized, was to get a medical rejection. While a person could claim to have symptoms (or feign homosexuality) if enough physicians sent letters that a person had a problem, he might well be rejected. It often wasn't worth the Army's time to dispute this claim. Such an approach worked best in a larger city where there was no stigma to not serving, and the potential draftee was not known to those reviewing him.

For others, the most common method of avoiding the draft was to cross the border into another country. People who have been "called up" for military service and who attempted to avoid it in some way were known as "draft-dodgers". Particularly during the Vietnam War, US draft-dodgers usually made their way to Canada, Mexico or Sweden.

Many people looked upon draft-dodgers with scorn as being "cowards", but some supported them in their efforts. In the late years of the Vietnam War, objections against it and support for draft-dodgers was much more outspoken, because of the casualties suffered by American troops, and the actual cause and purpose of the war being heavily questioned.

Toward the end of the US draft, an attempt was made to make the system somewhat fairer by turning it into a lottery, with each of the year's calendar dates randomly assigned a number. Men born on lower numbered dates were called up for review. For the reasons given above, this did not make the system any fairer, and the entire system ended in 1973. Today, American men 18-25 are required to register with the government, but there has not been a callup since the Vietnam Era.

There are those who are immune to the draft in certain countries; these people include anyone who works for the government (teachers, police officers, lawmakers, etc.), people who work for government contractors, and those who work in jobs essential to the operation of the country (waste management, power plants, etc.). In the United Kingdom this is known as a reserved occupation which is deemed necessary to the survival of the nation.

In Israel, the Muslim and Christian Arab minority are exempt from mandatory service, as are permanent residents such as the Druze of the Golan Heights. Ultra-Orthodox Jews may apply for a deferment of draft to study in Yeshiva, but once they are finished studying, they are required to do national or army service. Druze and Circassian Israeli citizens are liable, by agreement with their community leaders. Members of the exempted groups can still volunteer, but very few do, except for the Bedouin where a relatively large number have tended to volunteer.

Evasion of conscription

Template:Globalize/USA

Historically, there has been resistance to conscription in almost every country and situation where it has been imposed. The New York Draft Riots (July 11 to July 16, 1863; known at the time as Draft Week), were violent disturbances in New York City that were the culmination of discontent with new laws passed by Congress to draft men to fight in the ongoing American Civil War. The Central Asian Revolt started in the summer of 1916, when the Russian Empire government ended its exemption of Muslims from military service.

In the USA and some other countries, the Vietnam War saw new levels of opposition to conscription and the Selective Service System. Many people opposed to and facing conscription chose to either apply for classification and assignment to civilian alternative service or noncombatant service within the military as conscientious objectors, or to evade the draft by fleeing to a neutral country. A small proportion, like Muhammad Ali, chose to resist the draft by publicly and politically fighting conscription. Some people resist at the point of registration for the draft. In the USA since 1980, for example, the draft resistance movement has focused on mandatory draft registration. Others resist at the point of induction, when they are ordered to put on a uniform, when they are ordered to carry or use a weapon, or when they are ordered into combat.

In the United States, especially during the Vietnam Era, some used political connections to ensure that they were placed well away from any potential harm, serving in what was termed a Champagne unit. Many would avoid military service altogether through college deferments, by becoming fathers, or serving in various exempt jobs (teaching was one possibility). Others used educational exemptions, became conscientious objectors or pretended to be conscientious objectors, although they might then be drafted for non-combat work, such as serving as a combat medic. It was also possible they could be asked to do similar civilian work, such as being a hospital orderly.

It was, in fact, quite easy for those with some knowledge of the system to avoid being drafted. A simple route, widely publicized, was to get a medical rejection. While a person could claim to have symptoms (or feign homosexuality) if enough physicians sent letters that a person had a problem, he might well be rejected. It often wasn't worth the Army's time to dispute this claim. Such an approach worked best in a larger city where there was no stigma to not serving, and the potential draftee was not known to those reviewing him.

For others, the most common method of avoiding the draft was to cross the border into another country. People who have been "called up" for military service and who attempted to avoid it in some way were known as "draft-dodgers". Particularly during the Vietnam War, US draft-dodgers usually made their way to Canada, Mexico or Sweden.

Many people looked upon draft-dodgers with scorn as being "cowards", but some supported them in their efforts. In the late years of the Vietnam War, objections against it and support for draft-dodgers was much more outspoken, because of the casualties suffered by American troops, and the actual cause and purpose of the war being heavily questioned.

Toward the end of the US draft, an attempt was made to make the system somewhat fairer by turning it into a lottery, with each of the year's calendar dates randomly assigned a number. Men born on lower numbered dates were called up for review. For the reasons given above, this did not make the system any fairer, and the entire system ended in 1973. Today, American men 18-25 are required to register with the government, but there has not been a callup since the Vietnam Era.

There are those who are immune to the draft in certain countries; these people include anyone who works for the government (teachers, police officers, lawmakers, etc.), people who work for government contractors, and those who work in jobs essential to the operation of the country (waste management, power plants, etc.). In the United Kingdom this is known as a reserved occupation which is deemed necessary to the survival of the nation.

In Israel, the Muslim and Christian Arab minority are exempt from mandatory service, as are permanent residents such as the Druze of the Golan Heights. Ultra-Orthodox Jews may apply for a deferment of draft to study in Yeshiva, but once they are finished studying, they are required to do national or army service. Druze and Circassian Israeli citizens are liable, by agreement with their community leaders. Members of the exempted groups can still volunteer, but very few do, except for the Bedouin where a relatively large number have tended to volunteer.

Penalties for desertion from and evasion of military service

Algeria

Page 21 of a paper by the Library of Congress issued in May 2008 says under the heading ‘Military Service’ that “Military service is compulsory for males aged 19–30. The term of service is 18 months, consisting of six months of basic training and 12 months of civil projects” (Library of Congress, (May 2008), Country Profile: Algeria). Also in May 2008 a report by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers says “The legal basis for conscription into the regular armed forces remained the National Service Code. Algerian men were liable for 18 months’ compulsory conscription between the ages of 19 and 30, and an additional six months’ service as a reservist up to the age of 50. Some 375,000 young men were estimated as reaching military service age annually.7 Evading conscription was punishable by a five-year prison sentence in accordance with Article 254 of the Algerian Military Justice Code. The minimum age for voluntary recruitment into the armed forces or paramilitary forces was unclear” (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, (May 2008), Algeria: Child Soldiers Global Report 2008).

Page 13 of a paper in December 2007 by the Country of Return Information Project says “Consequences of non compliance with the de ne pas respecter les délais :The consular section has stated that an Algerian citizen who does not comply with the timetable for the regularisation may be considered to be absent without leave by the Algerian authorities (Algerian embassy 24 May 2005). Moreover according to the consular section , “It is possible that persons who are in an irregular situation with regard to the national service may not obtain a passport. But this are rare occasions since the implementation of regularisation measures (ibid.).” (Country of Return Information Project, (December 2007), Country Sheet; Algeria).

The IRB in September 2006 note “The section relating to national military service on the Web site of the Embassy of Algeria in Ottawa indicates that Algerians called up for military service can ask to be exempted from their obligation to serve for medical or social reasons, as follows: medical reasons: the applicant must submit a complete medical file and undergo tests administered by a medical board for military service aptitude. social reasons: duly registered Algerian citizens can apply for exemption from their obligation to perform military service if they are the sole provider for immediate or extended family members who are disabled or underage, or aged 27 years and over and gainfully employed. (n.d.)” (IRB, (5 September 2006), Algeria: Military card; documents regarding military service, deferral and exemption; description of those documents; procedure and conditions for obtaining deferral and exemption documents).

Research compiled by the IRB in June 2005 points out “Punishments for draft evaders According to the report, if an Algerian is convicted of draft evasion, sentences could entail incarceration for a maximum of 36 months, 18 months of military service, or both. The courts tend to impose "more lenient sentences, especially for those who merely sought to avoid doing their service, and the latter are, therefore, often only sentenced to do their normal service term." However, this information could not be corroborated by the Research Directorate within the constraints for this Response. Punishments for deserters Deserters are dealt with much more severely than draft evaders. If deserters under 55 years of age are caught, they can be taken before a military tribunal for trial. "The penalty can be 6 months' to 5 years' incarceration for junior military personnel and up to 10 years for an officer, after which he may still be required to finish his military service." However, Brian Davis could not provide any information "on how tribunals are presently deciding these types of cases." “(IRB, (7 June 2005), Algeria: Follow-up to DZA43564.FE of 18 May 2005 on procedures followed by the army in cases of desertion; whether deserters are being ordered to report by the gendarmerie; time allowed to respond to such orders, if applicable; whether the reason for desertion appears on the order to report; the current situation of deserters (January 2005-May 2005)). Also in June 2005 further research from the IRB points out that “Military service is mandatory in Algeria (Algeria-Watch 20 Feb. 2005; Davis May 2001). According to a report on Algeria by Brian Davis, published in May 2001 (available in regional documentation centres), - Law #68-82 of 16 April 1968 made military service an obligation; - Law #74-103 of 15 November 1974 specified that as of 19 years of age all males had to serve for a period of 24 months; - Law #89-19 of 12 December 1989 reduced the duration of service to 18 months (ibid.). "In the year he turns 18, man must register for service with the local designated authority" (ibid.). Announcements are made "over the radio and television and in the press to remind those who are turning 18 of the requirement to register" (ibid.). Those who are not given an exemption in the first step must undergo a medical examination and, if they are unsuccessful, they are sent "a call-up notice (ordre d'appel ) to appear by a certain date for induction into the military" (ibid.)” (IRB, (7 June 2005), Algeria: Obligations regarding military service and the reserve; the possibility of obtaining an exemption or stay, including the procedures to follow (May 2001-June 2005)). In May 2005 research by the IRB notes “According to the Website of the Algerian Embassy in Ottawa, Algerians can apply to be exempted from national service for medical reasons, because they are the "only family support for relatives, disabled relatives or minors," or because they are over 27 years of age and have a wage-earning job (n.d.b). For further information on the process to obtain an exemption from Algerian national service, consult the embassy's Website: <http://www.ambalgott.com/html/servicenational1.htm>. The Website of the Algerian Embassy in Ottawa indicates that regularization of national service status is offered to draft dodgers from 2002, that is, those who were born in 1982, and to "citizens from earlier groups who were late to regularize their status and who completed or abandoned their studies by 31 December 2001" (n.d.a). However, according to the consular section at the Algerian Embassy, this regularization is offered to people born in 1983 and earlier (24 May 2005). Persons concerned must report to Algerian authorities with their birth certificate, a piece of identification, their consular registration card, two photographs and a copy of their diploma (or a certificate indicating abandonment of studies) (Algerian Embassy n.d.a). The embassy also indicated that a certificate of activities and an application form, available on the embassy's This paper adds that “The consular section indicated that an Algerian citizen who fails to comply with the deadlines for regularization risks being considered a draft dodger by the Algerian authorities (Algerian Embassy 24 May 2005). n addition, according to the consular section, t is possible that people in an irregular national service situation may not be issued their passport. However, that possibility has become more remote with the implementation of the regularization measures (ibid.)” (ibid).

Another research paper by the IRB in May 2005 says “An undated article posted on the Algeria-Watch Website stated that "a large proportion of youths" avoid military service without even obtaining an exemption or stay (yellow card). According to the article, they wait-sometimes until their thirties-for a possible amnesty (Algeria-Watch n.d.). The article also stated that these youths are eventually forced to join the army after ignoring many notices to report for duty (ibid.). According to the Website for the Algerian consulate in Saint-Étienne, France, national service regularization does not apply to deserters, "under the 1999 presidential measures, which stipulate that Algerian citizens born before 31 December 1981 no longer have to justify their national service status at border stations upon leaving Algeria" (n.d.). An article published in the Buffalo News reported that an Algerian air force deserter who claimed asylum in the United States feared returning to his country because "the Algerian military treats deserters with severe penalties . . . if they're viewed as terrorist sympathizers" (8 Apr. 2004). However, this allegation could not be corroborated among other sources consulted by the Research Directorate. According to an article published in Jeune Afrique/L'Intelligent , "deserting officers" are among the groups (including "repentant terrorists") who wanted "to benefit from provisions in the future amnesty law" (17 Apr. 2005), but "o far, little is known about the terms of the proposed amnesty" (AI 14 Apr. 2005; see also Jeune Afrique/L'Intelligent 17 Apr. 2005), which should be adopted by the Algerian government during 2005 (ibid.). In a joint statement, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Center for Transitional Justice, the International Commission of Jurists and the International Federation for Human Rights expressed their concerns regarding "official statements indicate that the law will grant exemption from prosecution to any member of an armed group, state-armed militia or the security forces for crimes committed in the course of the conflict , including serious human rights abuses" in the interest of "national reconciliation" (AI 14 Apr. 2005)” (IRB, (18 May 2005), Algeria: Update to DZA35074.FE of 26 July 2000 on procedures followed by the army in cases of desertion; whether deserters are being ordered to report by the gendarmerie; time allowed to respond to such orders, if applicable; whether the reason for desertion appears on the order to report; the current situation of deserters (January 2005-May 2005)). An article in the Washington Post from March 2005 notes that “Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, have said that deserters from the Algerian military sometimes face "torture and execution upon return." The Algerian Embassy has in the past insisted that its military has not executed a deserter since 1962” (Washington Post, (22 March 2005), “U.S. Is Faulted Over Algerian's Detention; U.N. Panel Calls Confinement 'Arbitrary' “). Considering ‘draft evasion and desertion’ a paper in 1998 by War Resisters International says “Draft evasion and desertion are punishable under the 1971 Military Penal Code (Code de Justice Militaire (CJM)). According to art. 40 of the Military Code, a state of emergency is equivalent to a state of war. Algeria has been in state of emergency since 9 February 1992. This means that since 1992 the punishments as applicable in wartime prevail. Concerning penalties for draft evasion and desertion, no distinction is drawn between conscripts and professional soldiers. For officers the penalties are heavier. Draft evasion and refusal to perform military service (insoumission) is punishable by 3 months' to 5 years' imprisonment in peacetime. In wartime the penalty is from 2 to 10 years' imprisonment, and the convicted individual may lose all rights mentioned in art. 8 of the penal code. Officers may be dismissed. Insoumis are those called up who have not reported to the military within 30 days of a call-up notice (art. 16 CSN). The penalties for desertion are prescribed in arts. 255 to 270, depending on whether the deserter fled within the country, went abroad, or deserted to the enemy, and whether the deserter was alone or in a group. Desertion within the country is punishable by 6 months' to 5 years' imprisonment in peacetime; 2 to 10 years' in wartime (art. 256). If more than two men desert together this is considered desertion with conspiracy and punishable by one to 6 years' imprisonment in peacetime; 5 to 15 years' in wartime (art. 257).Desertion abroad is punishable by 2 to 10 years' imprisonment in peacetime; 10 to 20 years' in wartime (art. 258-264). In aggravated circumstances - for instance in case of desertion with conspiracy, desertion of officers, or if the deserters carried arms or ammunition - the penalty may be up to life imprisonment. If deserters flee to an armed group or to the enemy the maximum punishment is execution (arts. 266 to 269). Those who incite others to desert may be punished by 6 months' to 5 years' imprisonment in peacetime; 5 to 10 years' in wartime (art. 271).Those who hide deserters or try to keep them away from prosecution may be punished by two months' to two years' imprisonment (art. 272). Self-mutilation (in order to be unable to serve) is punishable by one to 5 years' imprisonment in peacetime; 5 to 10 years' in wartime (art. 273) “(War Resisters International, (30 June 1998), Country Report and Updates, Algeria).

Azerbaijan

Azeri law stipulates that males aged 18 to 35 years are obligated to provide military service in Azerbaijan (TNA 25 Dec. 2001). The recent “On conscription into military service” decree signed by President Aliyev on 13 June 2002 identified those born between 1967 and 1984 as potential conscripts during the call-up period of 1 to 20 July 2002 (ibid. 14 June 2002). For earlier Responses concerning military service in Azerbaijan, please consult AZE39702.E of 1 October 2002, AZE32568.E of 31 August 1999 and AZE31865.E of 7 May 1999.

According to Taisiya Gordeeva of the NGO, Soldier's Mothers Association of Azerbaijan, some 2,600 individuals were in prison for evading military service in 2002 (Eurasianet.org 13 Dec. 2002). War Resisters International also reported this figure and noted that “nothing is known about reasons of avoiding military service” (WRI 31 Oct. 2002).

In November 2002, Rafiq Aliyev of the Azerbaijani Committee for Work with Religious Structures stated that 2,000 draft-aged members of the Jehovah's Witness, Krishna and Protestant faiths were to be designated military evaders should they fail to respond to the military draft (ANS 1 Nov. 2002). WRI noted, however, that there were no cases of imprisoned conscientious objectors as of 31 October 2002 (31 Oct. 2002), and the Research Directorate did not find reports of arrests occurring after Aliyev's announcement. A draft alternative service law was reportedly scheduled for implementation in 2002 (WRI 31 Oct. 2002; Azernews 3-9 Oct. 2001; Zerkalo 31 July 2002); however, its passage into law was not reported among the sources consulted.

Incidents of individuals paying authorities to avoid criminal charges for draft evasion were not found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate. Taisiya Gordeeva told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) that, although military conscripts are required to serve at least two years, it is possible for those with the means “to buy their way out of conscription” (11 Nov. 2002). The act of purchasing release from military service obligations was also mentioned in a Zerkalo article concerning the introduction of alternative service legislation in 2002 (31 July 2002).

Belarus

There is no alternative service at present for conscientious objectors to military service. A draft law on alternative service (of a proposed length of three years, or twice the length of compulsory military service) has been under discussion in parliament since 1994. The Parliament did not include provisions for conscientious objectors in the Constitution adopted in March 1994.... The current law exempts from military service those who have served a term in a forced labour colony for a major criminal offence.

In the absence of alternative civilian service in Belarus young men who state their conscientious objection to military service continue to face prosecution by the military authorities, conviction on criminal charges for evading the service and imprisonment. According to statistics provided by the Belarus League for Human Rights, a local NGO, at the spring call-up in 1995, 30% of the conscripts refused to enter the service. According to the same source, 99% of these had gone in to hiding or they had feigned illnesses to avoid being drafted (19).

A 27 January 1998 Belapan News Agency article states:

The Belarusian Military Prosecutor's Office has reported that 776 criminal offences were committed in the Belarusian armed forces in 1997, an 11-per-cent decline compared to 1996. Property and ammunition thefts fell by 50 per cent, cases of conscription evasion fell by 27 per cent...

Military prosecutors uncovered 10 cases of bribery against 11 cases in 1996. However, reported cases of bullying new recruits rose by 6 per cent....In 1997, according to the Military Prosecutor's Office, 81 servicemen died an unnatural death against 86 in the previous year.

In the Belarusian army,...cases of conscription evasion by 27 percent and the number of participants in crimes fell by 25 per cent. Sixty-five servicemen died an unnatural death, seven of them were killed and 21 committed suicide....

The Military Prosecutor's Office reported ...a 50-per-cent rise in cases of bullying new recruits, a four-fold increase in the number of violations of the subordination procedure, and a five-fold increase in cases of physical abuse....

In the Internal Troops,...cases of conscription evasion by 27 per cent and cases of bullying by 15 per cent. However, criminal offences rose by 42 per cent and cases of physical abuse by 52 per cent. The Military Prosecutor's Office also reported cases of rape and bribery which were registered in 1996. In the railway troops,...a rise occurred in cases of bullying and physical abuse. One serviceman died an unnatural death. No suicide cases were reported to have taken place.

A 2 April 1998 ITAR-TASS article states:

Gen. Kauryn said that, under Belarusian laws, conscripts are called up for 18 months. At the moment, the republic does not have any alternative form of service, but provision for this and also for service in the reserve has been made in the new bill on compulsory military service. However, unlike normal military service, alternative service or service in the reserve will last three years, the general explained.

He also said the number of so-called "refuseniks" in the country was gradually falling. According to his information, 674 people failed to turn up at conscription offices last autumn. The previous year the figure was 806 and in 1993 and 1994, for example, the number of "refuseniks" was 1,500.

No information on the legal penalty in Belarus for refusal to perform one's compulsory military service, and whether citizens of Belarus who performed their obligatory military service with the armed forces of the Soviet Union are required to perform military service in the armed forces of Belarus, could be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please find below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

China

A 1991 Amnesty International report entitled Conscientious Objection to Military Service quotes article 61 of the 1985 Chinese law on military service:

Those who avoid or refuse registration ... conscription... military training education shall undergo education, and if this is unsuccessful, be forced by the local People's Government to carry out their military service (Jan. 1991, 7).

According to the same source, the penalties applicable to draft evaders are imposed by local governments, since the national legislation does not provide penalties for military service evasion (Jan. 1991, 7).

Agence France Presse (AFP) reports that in September 1993 the National People's Congress (NPC) of Guangzhou (Guangdong) submitted to the provincial NPC a draft law cracking down on people who try to avoid military service (8 Sept. 1993). Under the new law, military service evaders would "face fines ranging from 300 to 1,000 yuan and undergo 're-education', which could mean being sent to labour camps" (ibid.).

Columbia

No reference to recent legislative changes affecting military service or penalties for evasion or desertion could be found among the sources consulted. Recent reports indicate that an alternative "'social service'" is being contemplated by the new government, but this may not be in place before 2005 (Latin American Weekly Report 20 Aug. 2002, 390; Weekly News Update 11 Aug. 2002).

Further to the above, in July 2002 the commander of the army, General Jorge Mora Rangel, announced that recruits currently serving will have their terms of service extended for four months (Radio Caracol 5 July 2002). This extension reportedly would result in an increase of 10,000 men for the army (ibid.).

More recently, Radio Caracol reported that the municipal government of Bogota and the national government of Colombia reached an agreement in August 2002 that will allow residents of Bogota to fulfill military service obligations in their areas of residence as assistant police officers (auxiliares de policía) (9 Aug. 2002; ibid. 10 Aug. 2002). Unarmed civilian assistant police officers already exist in Bogota (ibid.), but filling the new positions through the compulsory military service system was expected to be enabled through a presidential decree (ibid. 10 Aug. 2002).

Egypt

According to 1998 information from War Resisters’ International, the penalty for refusing to serve is one year’s imprisonment and a fine. The information from War Resisters’ International on draft-evasion and desertion is as follows: penalties Refusal to perform military service is punishable by a year’s imprisonment and a fine. Also they may be punished by a prolongation of their military service for one year in the case of graduated students and for three years in other cases. Draft evaders and deserters who have fled abroad cannot renew their passports. In practice Draft evaders and men of conscription age are not allowed to travel abroad. In order to obtain a passport all men must prove they have completed military service or have been exempted. The number of draft evaders is not known, but according to Agence France Presse in 1993 more than 4,000 draft evaders were arrested by the security forces. Those who have acquired double nationality or who are over 30 and have avoided military service may get exempted but must pay a fine.

Eritrea

The 1957 Ethiopian penal code, which, according to AI, was adopted by Eritrea at independence (AI May 2004, 23), and, according to the British embassy in Asmara, was still in force in July 2003 (UK 1 Dec. 2006, para. 23.03), details various penalties for desertion from and evasion of military service (Eritrea July 1957). For example, penalties for "refusal to perform military service," "failure to enlist," "intentional provocation of unfitness" and "fraudulent evasion of service" range from "simple imprisonment" for six months to "rigorous imprisonment" for up to fifteen years (ibid., Art. 296-299). Penalties for desertion range from five years of "rigorous imprisonment" to the death penalty (ibid., Art. 300).

The US Department of State notes that the government authorizes the use of lethal force against anyone "resisting or attempting to flee during military searches for deserters and draft evaders," and that deaths were reported throughout 2005 (US 8 Mar. 2006, Sec. 1.a). Human Rights Watch reports that persons detained for evading national service are often "held incommunicado indefinitely without formal charge" (HRW Jan. 2007). Prison conditions are reportedly harsh and include overcrowding, extreme temperatures, solitary confinement, the absence of sanitation, "starvation rations," hard labour and mental abuse (ibid.; see also US 8 Mar. 2006, Sec. 1.c).

Both AI and the US Department of State note that there have been reports of sexual violence perpetrated against female conscripts (AI May 2004, 26; US 8 Mar. 2006, Sec. 1.c), including rape, sex under threat of harsh military duty or denial of leave and, in some cases, coercion amounting to sexual slavery (AI May 2004, 26; see also WRI n.d., 10). Impregnated women are generally returned to their families where, in the absence of a legitimate father, they are subject to "extreme social dishonour" within the community (AI May 2004, 26).

Draft evaders are reported to be "frequently tortured" (HRW 18 Jan. 2006; ibid. Jan 2007; AI May 2004, 2), while conscientious objectors face "extreme physical punishment" as a means of forcing them to perform their service (US 8 Mar. 2006, Sec. 2.c). As a result, three courts ruling on immigration issues – an appellate court in the United States, the European Court of Human Rights and the United Kingdom Immigration Appeal Tribunal – have each granted asylum to Eritreans escaping conscription "on the grounds that national service is used as a measure of political repression and that anyone forcibly returned to Eritrea is likely to be tortured" (HRW 18 Jan. 2006; see also European Court of Human Rights Aug. 2005, Art. 3).

Greece

Certain categories of men, such as those who are only children or are elder brothers of three or more children, or those who have already served in the military of neighbouring countries, are entitled to reduced service, while fathers of three or more children may be exempted from military service (Greece n.d.). On 7 July 2005, the Athens-based daily Kathimerini indicated that 55,000 Greek men had performed a reduced term of service due to family circumstances, but that the Ministry of Defence was investigating allegations that some of them had used false documentation to qualify for the reduction in service time.

Evasion

In a 1 March 2006 telephone interview with the Research Directorate, a consular officer from the Embassy of the Hellenic Republic in Ottawa provided the following information on the civil consequences of draft evasion:

According to Articles 51 to 54 of Law No. 3421 of 12 December 2005, unofficially translated as "Military Service for the Greeks," those who evade compulsory military service will face several consequences, including the following:

– They will not receive a military certificate showing that they served in the army, which is a prerequisite for obtaining certain jobs;

– They cannot vote or be elected;

– If they pursue a professional career that requires a licence (such as medicine, law, etc.), they cannot get this licence; if they already possess such a licence, it will be revoked;

– They cannot be employed as civil servants;

– They cannot leave the country or work on a ship that sails outside Greek waters;

– They cannot obtain a passport; if they already have one, it cannot be extended;

– If they eventually decide to complete their military service, they must serve six months in addition to the time normally required;

– Once they complete their military service, the previously mentioned consequences are void and their record is cleared (Greece 1 Mar. 2006). Further information on the legal consequences of draft evasion, including provisions contained in the Military Penal Code, could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within time constraints.

In August 2005, Kathimerini published two articles that dealt with what was perceived as the growing phenomenon of military service evasion (Kathimerini 16 Aug. 2005; ibid. 18 Aug. 2005). According to the Deputy Defence Minister Yiannis Lambropoulos, two-thirds of conscripts in 2004 did not register for their service (Kathimerini 16 Aug. 2005), and only about three-fifths of those whose service is deferred actually ever serve (ibid. 18 Aug. 2005). Qualifying the Greek draft system as "'close to collapsing'," Lambropoulos stated that "punishment was rarely meted out to draft dodgers or to armed forces officials who would often issue forged certificates of exemption" (ibid. 16 Aug. 2005). Lambropoulos further claimed that the 17,482 draft dodgers living abroad and the 14,950 living in Greece in 2004 "have had nothing to fear" because the law prohibiting evasion is not adequately applied, but insisted that "ll draft dodgers are being called up because is our goal, a punishment" (ibid. 18 Aug. 2005).

Conscientious Objection

Since 1997, Greeks have had the right to exercise conscientious objection (EBCO May 2004; Greece 5 Apr. 2004, Para. 678; see also Freedom House 2005), in which case they may fulfill their national duty by performing an alternative service, for a period of 23 months (International Religious Freedom Report 2005 8 Nov. 2005, Sec. 2) as stipulated by Law 2510/97 (WRI Feb. 2005; Greece 5 Apr. 2004). In April 2004, the Greek Government stated that as of June 2003, it had received 771 requests for conscientious objector status, and all but 13 of these requests were accepted (ibid.).

At least two sources described the length of the substitute service as "punitive" (AI 2005; WRI Feb. 2005; IHF 27 June 2005) and "discriminatory" (WRI Feb. 2005; IHF 27 June 2005). According to War Resisters' International (WRI), conscientious objector status can no longer be granted after one has begun or completed one's military service (WRI Feb. 2005). Furthermore, the status of conscientious objector is repealed for all those who refuse to perform the substitute service (WRI Feb. 2005).

According to the Greek Government, those who refuse to perform unarmed service must face the same consequences as those who refuse to perform armed military service: both are considered "insubordinate" (Greece 5 Apr. 2004), although further information on the sanctions for insubordination could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

Specific Cases

WRI highlighted the cases of Lazaros Petromelidis, a conscientious objector who in 1999 served ten weeks of a four-year sentence for draft evasion and was sentenced to a twenty-month suspended sentence in 2003 for "insubordination" after he refused to perform a thirty-month substitute service (WRI Feb. 2005). In 2005, WRI reported that Petromelidis was "under imminent threat of arrest" after failing to appear before a naval Court on charges of insubordination (ibid.), after which he was sentenced in absentia to 2.5 years' imprisonment (AI 31 May 2005; WRI Feb. 2005), and Amnesty International (AI) reported that once caught, Petromelidis would have to serve a total of 50 months in jail (31 May 2005). Further information on the situation of Lazaros Petromelidis could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within time constraints.

In a letter submitted in response to cases reported by the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, the Government of Greece stated the following concerning the case of Lazaros Petromelidis:

The prosecution of Mr. Petromelidis was an isolated event that resulted from his refusal to perform the alternative service required under the law in force at the time when he was recognized as a conscientious objector, and under no circumstances did it reflect the real picture of alternative service and human rights in Greece. Moreover, all the legal and practical aspects of this complex issue were at the time of the reply being examined, so Mr. Petromelidis – and probably others in a similar situation – would be given a second chance under the law to perform alternative service and thus have the charges of military offences having been committed withdrawn (UN 15 Mar. 2005). In May 2003, a professional soldier by the name of Giorgios Monastiriotis refused an order to go to the Persian Gulf, citing his disagreement with waging war against Iraq (AI 31 May 2005; WRI Feb. 2005). He was arrested and appeared before a military court in September 2004, where he was sentenced to 40 months' incarceration (WRI Feb. 2005) for desertion (IHF 27 June 2005). He served 22 days of this sentence before being released until an appeal hearing (AI 31 May 2005). However, in January 2005 he was sentenced once again for desertion, but his five-month sentence (WRI Feb. 2005) was suspended pending the appeal (AI 31 May 2005). At the time of its report, WRI stated that Monastiriotis was awaiting his appeal trial (WRI Feb. 2005). More recent information on this case could not be found within time constraints.

In May 2005, four other conscientious objectors, three of whom were Jehovah's Witnesses, were awaiting appeal trials after they were sentenced to suspended incarcerations (ranging from six to twenty-four months) (AI 31 May 2005; WRI 18 May 2005).

In May 2005, AI cited a "landmark decision" by the Athens Military Court in allowing a conscientious objector of the Jehovah's Witness faith who was in pre-trial detention for insubordination "to apply for alternative civilian service" (11 May 2005, Sec. 2). Further details or corroboration of the details of this case could not be found within time constraints.

Iran

In Iran, military service is compulsory and there is no provision for alternative service. The length of service is two years, and conscientious objection is not recognized. Possible penalties for refusal to perform military service in Iran include a "longer than normal period of military service; possible suspended prison sentence."

Articles 58 through 67 of the Public Military Service act cover the general penalties and public punishments for persons who evade conscription. In particular, those individuals evading conscription during war time do not receive their permanent completion/exemption card for a period of from five to seven years (Article 58), and without these cards, the draft evader cannot be employed in "any ministries, governmental and affiliated institutions, factories, workshops or private companies" (Article 62).

Measures taken by the authorities against draft evaders and deserters allegedly included the death penalty for some Iranians in 1988. One article refers to a high incidence of absentee conscripts in 1985-1986, and a concomitant rise in the arrests of conscripts. Western sources estimated there were 100,000 Iranian draft evaders by 1985-86, and that an additional 3,000 fled to West Germany in one month, during an Iranian conscription drive. The numbers are substantially lower since the end of the Iran-Iraq war.

In January 1989, it was announced that a campaign to find draft dodgers was to begin on 8 January 1989. The official in charge stated that "as far as possible, severe punishments are envisaged to deal seriously and legally with those individuals who have evaded the sacred duty of being conscripts under various excuses during the eight year holy defence. The draft dodgers, who are found and arrested ... will not find leniency and they will not qualify for the four-month amnesty law."

In February 1989, a government plan to announce a general amnesty for Iranians abroad was discussed in the press. The proposed plan apparently did not materialize, however, as evidenced by statements made by Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani in a news conference he conducted with the international press on 8 June 1989. During this conference, he discussed the high number of Iranian exiles who had left because they could not face the war, and stated that "we have not yet proclaimed a general amnesty. Those who have committed a major crime are at present being investigated. But the majority of the rest can return."

Recent information on the penalty for illegal departure from Iran is currently unavailable to the IRBDC. According to the UNHCR branch office in Canada, persons known to the UNHCR who returned in the past without documents were all either detained or disappeared. However, there is no other documentation available to the IRBDC which corroborates this statement. The Amnesty International Report 1989 refers to an incident reported in the Turkish press in August 1988. Allegedly, "40 out of a group of 58 Iranian asylum-seekers handed over by the Turkish authorities to the Iranian authorities were executed in Orumieh on the Iranian side of the border".

According to External Affairs Canada, each returnee is apparently dealt with on an individual basis, and there does not seem to be any set criteria for determining which people may experience difficulties, and which will not.

A scheme for encouraging the return of Iranians living abroad was announced by the Iranian government during 1989. Essentially, males of draft age can return to Iran for a visit and upon the payment of ten thousand dollars they will receive a new Iranian passport and exemption from military service for three years. It should be noted that this announcement took place prior to Mr. Rafsanjani's remarks to the press in June.

In the FAX announcing this policy shift, External Affairs Canada cautions potential returnees to "read the fine print carefully" before returning.

Israel

In 23 February 2009 correspondence sent to the Research Directorate, a representative from New Profile, a pacifist non-governmental organization (NGO) opposed to the compulsory military draft (New Profile n.d.), distinguishes between sanctions imposed upon people who have been legally exempted from military service and those sanctions imposed upon draft evaders (ibid. 23 Feb. 2009a). According to the Representative, few draft evaders are able to avoid imprisonment (ibid. 23 Feb. 2009a).

In 2005, the Australian-based Green Left Weekly reported that there were approximately 1,600 Israelis who "declared their refusal to either serve in the or in the military" (27 Apr. 2005), though this figure could not be corroborated among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate. According to The Jerusalem Post, many draft evaders are combat veterans, while resistance among 18-year olds is "extremely rare, if not unheard of" (18 Aug. 2006).

Consequences of illegally avoiding military service

Under Israeli military law, penalties for avoiding military service differ depending on whether such avoidance is deemed to constitute absence without leave or desertion (Israel 2008, 15). Section 94 of the Military Jurisdiction Law states that, in the absence of reasonable justification, "absence from service without permission is punishable by 3 years imprisonment" while desertion, or "absence from military service with the intention not to return to the army, is punishable by 15 years imprisonment" (ibid.). According to the Representative from New Profile, persons who continually fail to report for military service may be sentenced to prison terms again and again (23 Feb. 2009a).

Cases reported in several media sources indicate that prison sentences for refusing an order or failing to report for duty because of objections to specific military operations can range from between two to four weeks (Ynet 17 Oct. 2006; Dawn 8 Aug. 2007; The Jerusalem Post 18 Aug. 2006) to a year or more (NZPA 9 Oct. 2008; VOA 8 Jan. 2004; LA Times 21 Aug. 2007). The Los Angeles Times notes that "Israelis who refuse outright to serve are prosecuted and sent to jail for a year or more ... ut those evaders ... numbered only a few dozen" between 2000 and 2007 (ibid.).

In December 2008, Amnesty International (AI) reported on nine teenagers who had recently been imprisoned for refusing to comply with call-up notices because of their opposition to Israel's presence in the Palestinian Territories (18 Dec. 2008). One such refuser, a 19-year-old, had reportedly already served 50 days in prison and was carrying out her third sentence (AI 18 Dec. 2008). A 2 January 2006 article from The Jerusalem Post reported on a conscientious objector who has been sentenced multiple times for refusing to obey orders.

A second representative from New Profile stated in correspondence with the Research Directorate that, in his opinion, social stigma against refusers has recently increased in Israel (New Profile 23 Feb. 2009b).

Consequences of refusing orders

According to the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI), an Israeli NGO that receives support from, among others, the European Commission and the New Israel Fund (PCATI June 2008.), soldiers who do not obey lawful orders are committing a military offence (ibid., 23). Israeli law provides that a soldier who disobeys an illegal order will not face prosecution (ibid.; Israel n.d.), while a soldier who obeys an illegal order may be found criminally responsible (PCATI June 2008, 23). For instance, a soldier who obeys an order to fire upon unarmed civilians may be punished with imprisonment (LA Times 8 Aug. 2007). In addition, a senior commander who observes soldiers abusing a detainee, even if the commander is not assigned to their unit, risks criminal prosecution for being "an accessory and a partner in the assault" if he or she does not intervene to stop the abuse (PCATI June 2008, 24-25). The Representative from New Profile noted that while he has on occasion heard of soldiers being convicted for carrying out illegal orders, he has never heard of a soldier being acquitted for refusing to obey an order (23 Feb. 2009a).

In 23 February 2009 correspondence with the Research Directorate, the first Representative from New Profile provided further details on the types of orders that soldiers might refuse: Some soldiers refuse to obey an order asking them to serve in a particular territory, such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), while others refuse to perform certain functions, such as carry weapons (New Profile 23 Feb. 2009a). Refusing an order is an offence that may be disciplined according to the Military Penal Code and in this way is similar to failing to report for duty (ibid.). The Representative stated that in the absence of a double jeopardy, "people are being repeatedly imprisoned for refusing the same order on conscientious grounds" (ibid.). The Representative noted, however, that in some cases, the military agrees not to deploy a soldier to the OPT and that "for very rare exceptions, " soldiers refusing to bear arms may be discharged (ibid.). The practice of refusing to follow military orders is most common among reserve soldiers and they are generally punished by repeated prison terms until the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) eventually decide to cease calling them up for service (ibid.).

In December 2006, Haaretz published excerpts from a report prepared by the Military Advocate General's Office which included details on acts of insubordination that took place during the 2005 military disengagement from the Gaza Strip (19 Dec. 2006). Of the 163 cases of insubordination (a number which indicated that it was "a limited phenomenon") that took place prior to and during the disengagement, the IDF indicted 3 soldiers (of whom 1 was imprisoned) and tried 65 in a disciplinary court (of whom 46 were sentenced to jail terms) (Haaretz 19 Dec. 2006). Another 49 soldiers or officers received non-prison sanctions, such as removal from command positions (ibid.). One officer, for instance, received a relatively light sentence from the Central Command Military Court because his background in the settler community and his good standing in the military were taken into account (ibid.). Stiffer sentences were handed out in cases where the insubordination was highly public, such as before television cameras (ibid.). For example, a brigade rabbi who "called for insubordination on camera" was demoted and sentenced to 4.5 months' imprisonment (ibid.).

Consequences of legally avoiding military service

Following an apparent increase in incidents of draft evasion (LA Times 21 Aug. 2007; The Jerusalem Post 14 Jan. 2008), The Jerusalem Post reported in 2008 that the Ministry of Transportation would begin sharing information with the army on young people who were able to obtain driver's licences but who had previously been found psychologically unfit to serve in the military (ibid.). This initiative, which seeks to identify people who have fraudulently obtained a medical exemption from military service, met with criticism from some groups that claimed it infringed upon citizens' right to privacy (ibid.). In addition, the Los Angeles Times reports that the IDF is considering "a new category of dishonourable discharge for those judged to have faked ailments" (LA Times 21 Aug. 2007).

The first Representative from New Profile stated that there are both formal and informal sanctions against those who do not serve, even for those who are legally exempted from military service on the basis of health, religious belief, conscientious objection or ethnicity (such as the majority of Arab-Israelis who are not obligated to serve) (New Profile 23 Feb. 2009a; see also LA Times 21 Aug. 2007). According to the Representative, persons who are legally exempted from military service are denied the preferential treatment given to veterans (including lower taxes, state guarantees for mortgage loans and higher minimum wage) (New Profile 23 Feb. 2009a). For example, non-veterans might encounter more difficulty when trying to renew a driver's licence or may not have access to social security payments until they are 20 years of age (ibid.). "Informal sanctions" could include having more difficulty in finding employment or entering universities before the age of 20 (ibid.) or, for artists, in accessing certain performance venues (ibid.; see also LA Times 21 Aug. 2007).

Possibility for soldiers to sue officers

The first Representative from New Profile stated that a soldier may lodge a complaint against an officer for improper conduct or wrong-minded orders, although he believes that such complaints are frequently disregarded (New Profile 23 Feb. 2009a). According to the Representative, a soldier may not sue an officer because "there no court that would accept such charges from an individual, unless one can prove material damage to oneself and demand compensation from the military" (ibid.). This information could not be corroborated among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

According to a 2006 pamphlet on military service prepared by Israel's Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, soldiers who wish to lodge a complaint regarding any aspect of their service must first report this to a non-commissioned officer (NCO) (Israel 2006, 32). Within the military bureaucracy, the office of the Mashakit Tash is responsible for conditions of service and may "intercede on behalf with commanding officer ask for special assistance" (ibid.).

Soldiers may submit, in writing, their inquiries to the Soldiers' Complaint Commissioner (Netzivut kvilot chayalim), "an independent body that handles inquiries and complaints from soldiers on issues including conditions of services, unreasonable orders or unfair treatment, injustice or blatant deviation from regulations" (ibid.).

The Public Appeals Commissioner (Katzin/Katzinat Pniyot HaTzibur) fields inquiries from soldiers (or family members of soldiers) in regular service or reserve duty who face "irregularities, injustices, and mismanagement in their units" (ibid.).

Korea, Republic of

According to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), military service is compulsory for South Korean men between 20 and 30 years of age (US 12 Dec. 2006). The same source reports that conscripts must serve between 24 and 28 months, "depending on the military branch involved" (ibid.).

In a submission made to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee, the government of South Korea said that it "does not recognise alternative forms of service for conscientious objectors to military service, for it may result in a rapid decline in its defence capability" (UN 10 Feb. 2005, para. 3). In the same statement, the government highlighted the threat posed by North Korea to its security (ibid.).

According to the UN Human Rights Committee, the maximum penalty for refusing active military service in Korea is three years' imprisonment (UN 31 Oct. 2006). Moreover, the committee added, "there is no legislative limit on the number of times may be recalled and subjected to fresh penalties" (ibid.).

With respect to criminal punishments for conscientious objectors, the government of Korea provided the following information contained in a UN report.

•Total : 1 765 •Two or more years imprisonment: 17 •From one a half to less than two years imprisonment: 1 142 •Suspended sentence: 3 •Halt of indictment: 2 •Acquittal: 41 •Suspension of indictment: 2 •Pending in court: 558 (UN 10 Feb. 2005, para 27A) Korean men who fail to "satisfy military requirements" are subsequently disqualified from being employed by the government or public organizations, according to the UN Human Rights Committee (UN 31 Oct. 2006).

In 2005, eight men were reportedly discharged from the military for homosexuality (The Advocate 18 Feb. 2006; Korea Times 16 Feb 2006). However, South Korea has reportedly announced that it would "ease or end" its ban on gay soldiers (CSSM 30 May 2006; The Advocate 31 May 2006).

The Centre for the Study of Sexual Minorities (CSSM) – an official research unit of the University of California – reports that the first phase of Korea's new sexual orientation regulations came into force on 1 April 2006 (CSSM 30 May 2006). These new regulations reportedly "restrict the use of personal information about gay soldiers on military documents, end the forced medical examinations of gay troops and punish perpetrators of sexuality-based physical or verbal abuse" (ibid.). Further information on the implementation of these regulations could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

According to The Korea Times, human rights groups asked the Ministry of Defence to protect gay men from abuse "in the barracks" (15 Feb. 2006). An official from a gay rights group was quoted as saying, "The cases unearthed by our counselling efforts indicate that gay soldiers are vulnerable to a serious level of physical and mental abuse in the military" (Korea Times 15 Feb. 2006). The public exposure of "widespread but hidden anti-gay violence" in the military prompted the government to pass the new sexual orientation regulations, an Associate Professor of Sociology at Vassar College reportedly commented (CCSM 30 May 2006). In an article published by CCSM, the Associate Professor was also quoted as saying that time will tell whether or not the government's policy changes will translate into "significant change" (ibid.).

According to a report of the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), South Korea legally prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment (ILGA Nov. 2006). Moreover, Korea also prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in areas other than employment (ibid.; US 8 Mar. 2005).

However, a 2003 article in The Gully, an online gay and lesbian magazine, states that in South Korea, "no legal protection is guaranteed to queers" (6 June 2003). According to the same article, since 1995, there have been numerous reports of "police harassment of queers" (The Gully 6 June 2003). Police officers have reportedly forced gay bars and saunas to make payments and have also extorted money from homosexuals by threatening to expose their sexuality to their families (ibid.). The article further notes that

buses are rarely reported because gay people are afraid they'll be outed and know that the authorities – from social workers and doctors to the police, churches and government agencies – are, at best, unresponsive, and at worst, themselves perpetrators of homophobic violence. (The Gully 6 June 2003)

With respect to the social status of homosexuals, the Associate Professor from Vassar College also reportedly said that most people living in Asian countries see homosexuality as "abnormal" and social attitudes regarding homosexuality resemble those prevalent during 19th century Europe (CCSM 30 May 2006). The Advocate, a US-based gay and lesbian magazine, reports that Korea is a society with "strict Confucian traditions" and a "strong Roman Catholic Church" but added that "some acceptance" of homosexuality has recently been gained (18 Feb. 2006). The article pointed to a hit movie in Korea that centres on a gay love triangle (The Advocate 18 Feb. 2006).

Macedonia

The Ohrid peace agreement signed on 13 August 2001, helped to bring an end to the 2001 ethnic Albanian uprising (European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) n.d.; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) 8 Mar. 2002). An important element of the agreement was the creation of an amnesty law (ibid.). According to an unofficial translation on the European Country of Origin Information Network (ECOI) Website, the Macedonian Law on Amnesty adopted on 7 March 2002 states that under Article 2 "he provisions of rticle 1, exclusive of paragraph 4, of this Law also apply to persons who during the period of duration of the conflict have not responded to the invitation and avoided the military service and military exercise as well as persons that have arbitrarily left the armed forces" (Macedonia 8 Mar. 2002). For the full text of this law, please refer to the electronic attachment.

Quoting the Albanian daily Fakti, the Republic of Macedonia's Agency of Information reported that the Amnesty Law '"stipulates a general amnesty for all members of the NLA and for deserters"' (Macedonia 12 Mar. 2002). The law "amnestied men who refused conscription for army service and others who deserted" (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 13 Mar. 2002).

   Article 3 of the Defence Law of the Republic of Macedonia, enacted on 14 February 1992, states that "ll male citizens of the Republic, aged 17 to 55 are obligated to fulfill the military obligation." Article 7 states that conscripts must complete nine months of service in the Armed Forces (Macedonia 14 Feb. 1992). 

Article 344 of the Criminal Code of Macedonia, enacted on 23 July 1996, states that if a military person fails to complete compulsory service by leaving "his unit or service," he shall be fined or imprisoned up to one year while a person who abandons his unit or service during an important operation shall be imprisoned for three months to three years. Article 344 further states that if a member of the armed services leaves the country to avoid military service, that person shall face between one to ten years imprisonment (Macedonia 23 July 1996). No information on the treatment of draft evaders who are older than 27 years of age could be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

According to a 19 March 2001 Glas Srpski news report on the Alternative Information Network Website (AIM), a "pokesman of the Ministry of Defence of Macedonia Djordji Trandafilovski declared today in Skopje that a call-up of the reserve forces of the Macedonian Army had begun" (AIM 19 Mar. 2001). No information on whether Macedonia issued call-up notices to men over 40 years of age during the 2001 uprising could be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

For further information, please refer to MCD40320.E of 12 May 2003 and MCD40738.E of 27 May 2003.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please find below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Russia

Each year, hundreds of young men in Moscow and St. Petersburg are detained and forcibly conscripted into the Russian armed forces, Human Rights Watch said in a new report today. The twenty-page report, entitled "Conscription through Detention in the Russian Armed Forces," examines the discriminatory treatment of young men who have not been successfully served with draft summonses and are forcibly brought to recruitment offices by police officials. They are given no effective opportunity to challenge their conscription, although Russian law gives draftees that right. ilitary officials send these conscripts to their assigned military units the very day they are detained, preventing contact with their families or advocacy groups who would help them appeal a conscription order. The report found that this practice effectively denies young men the right, under Russian law, to appeal their conscription. Using accelerated conscription procedures, draft boards deny those detained for conscription a thorough medical examination and the benefit of medical or other exemptions and deferrals that are clearly provided for in Russian law. In several of the cases researched by Human Rights Watch, the arbitrary proceedings resulted in young men with valid deferral or exemption grounds being drafted into the armed forces.

Conscription Through Detention In Russia's Armed Forces EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Each year, hundreds of young men in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and several other large cities are detained and sent, often the same day, to military bases. Because military officials have been unable to serve them with draft summonses, they consider these young men potential draft dodgers and put their names on lists that they turn over to the police. Police then detain and forcibly take them to the military recruitment office. Once there, officials quickly process the men, by-passing established conscription procedures and often refusing to consider legitimate grounds for deferral or exemption from military service. The draft board almost always issues a conscription order and then typically denies the conscript any opportunity to inform his family of his whereabouts and imminent departure, or to exercise his right to appeal the conscription order. Instead, the majority are sent immediately to military bases, where they often face violent hazing, systematic malnutrition and inadequate medical care, and other human rights abuses that are endemic to the Russian military.1

Young men in Russia have a duty under law to perform military service. Under international law, conscription is viewed as an exercise of a state's sovereignty, and no provisions of international human rights law prohibit it. The Russian armed forces' reputation for serious abuses motivates many young men to try actively to avoid the draft. Often, they do so by avoiding being served draft summonses, which under law must be physically handed to them for signature.2 Military officials justify detention for the purpose of conscription as a legitimate method of dealing with this problem.

The practice of conscription through detention makes headlines in the Russian media each year during conscription periods because of the dramatic sight of hundreds of young men being carted off to military bases without as much as a phone call home. It has been one of many factors generating resentment among the Russian public toward compulsory military service and contributing to public debate on reform of the conscription system and the possible introduction of a professional army.

This report does not take a position on this important debate but addresses the legal rights of men detained for conscription. It examines the discriminatory treatment they receive at draft boards, which prejudicially view them as though they had been convicted of draft evasion. The accelerated conscription procedure denies potential conscripts a thorough medical examination and the benefit of medical or other exemptions and deferrals that are clearly provided for in the law. By sending conscripts to their assigned military units the very day they are detained and preventing them from having contact with their families or advocacy groups, officials also effectively deny them their right, under Russian law, to appeal the conscription. Moreover, Russian law does not specifically authorize police to detain young men who have not been successfully served with a draft summons, thereby raising a more general concern that such detentions may be arbitrary.

To research this report, Human Rights Watch interviewed fourteen young men detained for conscription in Moscow and St. Petersburg between 2000 and 2002; they had either fled from recruitment offices or military bases, or were later decommissioned for health reasons. Human Rights Watch researchers also analyzed more than fifty complaints about conscription through detention sent throughout the last two years to the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia in Moscow and the Soldiers' Mothers of St. Petersburg.

Human Rights Watch calls on the Russian government to take steps to end the violations that occur as a result of the practice of conscription through detention. First and foremost, the Russian government should address the widespread abuses in the armed forces that make so many young men anxious to avoid military service. Russia may decide that the introduction of a professional army is the most appropriate way to address this problem. In the meantime, the Russian government and legislature should take the following steps:

•Abolish the "accelerated" conscription procedure. Russian law on conscription does not provide for an alternative procedure for potential draft dodgers but establishes one procedure applicable to all Russian men of conscription age. The Ministry of Defense should take steps to end the use of the accelerated conscription procedure with respect to perceived draft dodgers. It should carefully monitor the conscription process to ensure that existing legal provisions are fully observed in all cases.

•Instruct police officials not to detain, but to physically serve potential conscripts with their draft summonses, obtain their signature, and inform them of the consequences of failure to appear at conscription proceedings. The State Duma and government should introduce this interpretation in the text of the law and regulation on military service respectively.

•Specify a minimum time period between receiving a conscription order and the day of departure to a military base that allows young men a realistic opportunity to exercise their right to appeal. Current legislation indicates that a potential recruit must be allowed time to go home after a draft board has decided to draft him, but does not specify a minimum time period. Recruitment officials have used this gap in the law to justify sending potential draft dodgers to military bases immediately after the draft board has made a decision. The State Duma and the government should introduce a minimum time period in the law and the government regulation on conscription. This minimum time period must be long enough to provide for a realistic opportunity to exercise the right to appeal.

BACKGROUND ON CONSCRIPTION IN RUSSIA The Russian Federation has had a conscription army since 1918.3 In recent years, approximately 400,000 young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-seven are drafted each year to serve in the regular army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs forces, border troops, and other branches of Russia's vast armed forces.4 During the Soviet period conscription was a fact of life that was not open to public discussion. But after perestroika, Russians were able to voice their objections to conscription, and it became increasingly unpopular with the Russian public. Combined with reports about the disastrous state of the Russian military, these objections spurred many debates about transition to a professional army.

The immense public antipathy toward conscription is closely linked to numerous exposés about endemic abuses in the armed forces. Among the first was Yuri Poliakov's 1987 novel, One Hundred Days Until the Order, which gave the Soviet public the first opportunity to read a frank account of violent hazing of conscripts during their first year of service.5 In subsequent years, especially after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the media continued to expose the appalling conditions in the armed forces, including severe malnutrition and poor medical care that sometimes led to death and permanent injury of conscripts. Journalists also provided vivid descriptions of conscripts' desperation that too often led to suicide, frequent attempts to desert, and a pattern of deserters going on shooting sprees or committing suicide in order to avoid having to return to their military unit.6

As young men of conscription age and their parents became increasingly wary about the perils of military service, many of them started looking for ways, both legal and illegal, to avoid it.7 A network of soldiers' mothers' organizations emerged throughout the Russian Federation dedicated to helping young men and their parents find legal ways of avoiding conscription. For more than ten years, these groups-one of Russia's most widespread and effective grassroots movements-have helped thousands of young men avoid being drafted arbitrarily when they had legitimate grounds not to serve. They have also helped defend the rights of numerous conscripts who fled their units due to ill-treatment, malnutrition, and other abuse.

Popular discontent with the treatment of conscripts reached new heights in the mid-1990s, when Russia's military leadership sent poorly prepared conscripts to fight in the war in Chechnya. Thousands of conscripts died.8 By 1996, conscription was so unpopular that, as part of a desperate effort to boost his ratings during the election campaign, then-President Boris Yeltsin promised to abolish it after he was reelected. Yeltsin abandoned his promise. Today, with Russia's second Chechen war entering its fourth year, young men of conscription age continue to fear being sent to Chechnya to fight, although public protests against the war have not reached 1996 levels.

In November 2001, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced plans for a long-term and sweeping overhaul of the armed forces. The plan envisages significantly downsized armed forces made up only of well-paid professionals and equipped with updated military hardware by 2010. It calls for the gradual abolishment of conscription, starting in 2004.9 In March 2002, Ivanov announced that the Ministry of Defense would start by transforming one paratrooper division in mid-2002, an experiment he said would allow officials to plan for the subsequent transition of the rest of the armed forces.10 Although many Ministry of Defense officials seemed skeptical about the transition to a professional army, few challenged the view that reforms were necessary.

The Conscription Process

Russian law gives detailed guidelines for the various stages of the conscription process. These guidelines, found in the 1998 law on military service and a 1999 implementing regulation, are applicable without exception to all young men of conscription age.11

In the year he turns seventeen, a male citizen is entered into the military registry (in Russian: voinskii uchet). At this time, a preliminary determination is made as to whether he is fit for military service or has grounds for a non-medical exemption.12

When he turns eighteen, a Russian male receives a summons to appear at his local draft board for conscription proceedings. According to the regulation on conscription, he must be directly handed the summons and must sign it.13 If a young man is handed a draft summons and signs but subsequently does not appear for conscription proceedings, he is considered to be a draft dodger and is prosecuted under the criminal code.14 If officials are unable to physically hand a young man a summons, the military recruitment office may request the local police precinct in writing to help "ensure" his presence at conscription proceedings.15 Human Rights Watch did not find any cases in which a man delivered with a summons refused to sign, and it is unclear what consequences ensue in such cases.

Conscription proceedings ordinarily consist of a medical exam by physicians to determine a candidate's fitness for military service,16 and a determination by the draft board (in Russian, prizyvnaia komissia) as to whether he should be exempted from military service, given a deferral, placed in reserve, drafted, or sent to perform alternative service.17 It also assigns the candidate to a specific branch of service.18

Once the draft board has reached a decision to conscript, it informs the draftee, who is entitled to a copy of the conscription order upon request.19 The draft board then allows him to go home to await a service summons to appear at the collection point (in Russian, sbornyi punkt) from which he is to depart to his military base.20 This waiting period typically lasts from one day to about three months. During this time, the young man may appeal the draft board's decision.21 At the collection point, the municipal or province draft board reviews the decisions of the local commission, and a panel of medical doctors once again examines his fitness. After these procedures, representatives of military units meet the new conscripts and arrange for their departure.22

Draft Quota Problems

Due in part to conscription's unpopularity and in part to the deteriorating health of Russia's youth, recruitment authorities in many cities throughout Russia cannot meet draft quotas, and many of those drafted have been described as in poor health.23

Many young men of conscription age do not want to serve in the armed forces. They are worried about endemic hazing, being sent to Chechnya, or simply see spending two years in the army as a waste of their time and career opportunities. Some are conscientious objectors who have no options for real alternative civilian service.24 Many temporarily or permanently avoid military service by enrolling in educational programs, or finding government jobs that allow them to defer service, or by having a doctor document legitimate health problems that disqualify them for service.25 Other young men use illegitimate means to avoid being conscripted by, for example, paying bribes to members of draft boards, doctors, or other officials.

Others simply avoid recruitment officials. They refuse to open the door when officials come to their homes to hand them draft summonses, do not live where they are registered, and ignore the summonses that are dropped into their mailboxes.26 According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces, every year 30,000 young men ignore draft summonses and fail to appear for conscription proceedings.27 This figure appears to include both young men to whom officials served summonses but who failed to appear for conscription proceedings, and young men who ignored summonses that had not been properly served and are thus invalid under the law. In July 2002, the Russian media reported that in Nizhnii Novgorod the number of people the military recruitment office considered such draft evaders outnumbered those actually drafted during that conscription period.28

Military officials have found it particularly difficult to conscript young men in Moscow, likely a consequence of better access to information, greater career opportunities, and the higher level of wealth Moscow's youth enjoy compared to their peers elsewhere in Russia. The conscription quota set for Moscow is low compared to other regions, but recruitment officials still have difficulty meeting it. In the fall of 2001, only about 3 percent of all conscripts were drafted from Moscow, whereas young men of draft age in Russia's largest city make up almost 6 percent of the total number of young men of draft age in Russia.29 Official statistics for the 2001 fall conscription period show that between 50 and 60 percent of all young men processed by Moscow draft boards had an education-related right to deferral, 30 percent were declared unfit for military service, and 2 percent received a deferral based on their family situation.30 It is unclear what percentage of Muscovites of conscription age simply ignored draft summonses, served properly or not, in the fall of 2001, but according to official statistics about 10,000 Muscovites failed to appear at military recruitment offices for conscription proceedings.31 According to the Soldiers' Mothers of St. Petersburg, a similar situation exists in St. Petersburg.32

The deteriorating health of Russia's youths has compounded the conscription crisis. Poor health has disqualified about 50 percent of Russia's young men for military service each year in recent years. A Ministry of Defense official told a press conference in April 2002 that in 2001, doctors on draft boards found no less than 54 percent of the young men tested unfit for military service.33 Another official said that for the 400,000 young men drafted some 600,000 young men are declared unfit each year.34

Because Russia's youth is wracked with poor health, and because many of Russia's most healthy and educated young men successfully manage to avoid military service, recruitment officials are often left to select conscripts from a group of young men with low education levels and sometimes serious health problems. An unidentified Russian lawmaker told The Moscow Times that, in a speech to the State Duma, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said the young men drafted in the fall of 2001 were a "pathetic lot, afflicted with drug addiction, psychological problems and malnutrition."35 Ministry of Defense statistics indicate that every second conscript had an alcohol problem prior to entering service, and that every fourth had been a drug user.36 In October 2001, Moscow's acting military commissioner Viktor Beznosikov also complained at a press conference about the decreasing level of education among new conscripts and the increasing number of new conscripts with a criminal record.37 A July 2002 edition of the web publication Grani.ru described the average conscript as a "young man who has not completed high school" who, prior to being drafted, "did not study or work and indulged in vodka and narcotics." It concluded that the "absolute majority of conscripts come from poor and socially disadvantaged families that do not have the means to enroll the young man in paid education or buy them a false certificate for deferral."38

In response to the conscription crisis, officials have recently slashed conscription quotas; whereas traditionally about 200,000 people were conscripted during each of the two conscription periods, in the spring of 2002 the quota was set for just over 160,000.39 The Ministry of Defense is also developing legislation that would cut the list of deferral grounds and enable recruitment officials to draft tens of thousands of additional young men who currently work for government agencies.40 It remains unclear if and when this legislation will enter into force. Finally, in a number of large cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, recruitment officials have reverted to detaining perceived draft dodgers for conscription.41

CONSCRIPTION THROUGH DETENTION When recruitment officials are unable to serve a draft-age man with a summons, they submit his name to the police with a request that the police intervene to "ensure presence" at conscription proceedings.42 The police then detain these young men at their homes, at metro stations, and in other public places and forcibly take them to the military recruitment office. Once there, officials quickly process them in accelerated conscription procedures, limiting their contacts with the outside world to avoid intervention by relatives. The majority of these conscripts are sent to military units the same day they are detained.

The Military Recruitment Office's Lists

During conscription seasons, recruitment offices compile lists of young men to whom they have not been able to serve draft summonses and submit these to local police precincts with a request for assistance. Although these lists generally include names of men who had indeed sought to avoid being served draft summonses, sometimes they were compiled in a haphazard fashion and included people with valid exemption or deferral grounds.

Officials say conscription through detention is aimed at drafting those who try to avoid military service. In July 2002, Vasilii Krasnogorskii, Moscow's military commissioner, said recruitment offices request police assistance because there "are people who do not show up at the required time and they need to be found."43 For this purpose, recruitment offices compile lists of suspected draft dodgers that they send to local police precincts with a request for assistance. In accordance with conscription regulations, recruitment officials can make such requests only if they had a valid reason to summon the young man-in other words if he was not entitled to a deferral or exemption-and if officials attempted to hand the individual the summons in person but failed.44

Recruitment officials may often have solid grounds to include young men on lists sent to police. In several cases Human Rights Watch researched, young men admitted they did not have a right to a deferral, tried to avoid receiving and signing summonses, and ignored those that were left in their mailboxes.45 One young man said that before opening the door he always checked who was there so as to avoid being conscripted.46 The mother of another said that after her family moved from Kyrgyzstan to St. Petersburg, she simply did not enter her son in the local military registry there, hoping he would thus avoid military service.47 In several other cases researched by Human Rights Watch, military recruitment offices appeared to have grounds to detain young men who claimed they had student deferrals. In these cases, either educational institutions had failed to confirm to military recruitment offices that the men were indeed students, as the regulation on the military registry requires them to do once every year,48 or the young man had been temporarily expelled from university for failure to pay tuition or pass exams and had failed to inform the military recruitment offices that he had been reinstated. Consequently, military recruitment offices no longer considered them to be students and summoned them for conscription proceedings. As the young men consistently ignored summonses, military recruitment offices came to consider them as potential draft dodgers.49

Human Rights Watch is concerned, however, that the lists are sometimes compiled in such a haphazard manner that individuals are included on the list even when they are exempt from military service. In two cases we researched, recruitment officials included in their lists young men who had had legitimate deferral or exemption grounds. For example, Dmitrii K. from St. Petersburg told Human Rights Watch he had consistently appeared at the military recruitment office when summoned, and at its request was gathering medical reports for exemption when on December 27, 2000, police unexpectedly knocked on his door and took him to the military recruitment office.50 In another case, Alexander B. told Human Rights Watch he had finished the officer's training program at his university and could no longer be conscripted according to ordinary procedure, and that his university notified the recruitment office of this. Yet on November 27, 2001, police officers detained him at a Moscow metro station and brought him to the recruitment office.51

Police Detentions Pursuant to a Request from the Military Recruitment Office

There is no specific provision in the law on military service that authorizes police to detain individuals who have not been successfully served with draft summonses. The law stipulates that upon written request from the military recruitment office, police precincts are responsible for "ensuring the presence" at conscription proceedings of the young men listed in the request. However, the law does not specify how the wording "ensuring the presence" is to be understood. Police interpret this provision as an instruction to detain the individual and forcibly take him to the recruitment office, a position that the prosecutor's office supports. 52 However, neither the law on the police, which contains a detailed list of the scenarios in which police are authorized to detain individuals, nor the law on administrative offenses authorizes police to detain suspected draft dodgers for the purpose of their delivery to military recruitment offices. In fact, it is plausible to interpret the provision as instructing police to find the individual, hand him the summons, order him to sign it, and inform him of the consequences of failure to appear for conscription proceedings at the specified time. Human Rights Watch is unaware of internal regulations that clarify the provision, or of any guidance offered by the courts on its interpretation. In September 2002, we requested a meeting with the Moscow municipal police to seek clarification regarding the exact legal grounds for the detentions. After telephone and written communications, a meeting regrettably was not arranged. It thus remains unclear whether there is a legal basis in Russian law for such detentions, and therefore open to question that Russia has violated the international norm prohibiting arbitrary detention.53

As a rule, police officers, often accompanied by an official from the military recruitment office, detain young men at their homes early in the morning. While in some cases police took the young men straight to the military recruitment office, in others they first spent several hours at the police precinct.

On May 16, 2002 at 7:40 a.m., police officers came to Stepan O.'s house. After his parents had woken him up, the officers explained that he had to go to the military recruitment office.54 Stepan O.'s parents confirmed in court that the officers had been polite and had given Stepan O. sufficient time to get dressed.55 The officers took Stepan O. to the 19th police precinct, where they held him in a cage for about ninety minutes before bringing him to the recruitment office.

In another case, early in the morning of November 22, 2001 police officers came to the home of Sergei S. They were generally polite, asked him his name, and told him they were taking him to the military recruitment office. On the way, Sergei S. escaped from the police car. On May 23, 2002, police officers returned and forcibly entered his home. Sergei S. told Human Rights Watch he was awoken when he felt someone kicking him in his side. When he opened his eyes, he saw a police officer and military officer. After Sergei S. confirmed his identity, the officers told him he would have to come with them. While Sergei S. got dressed, the officers looked around his apartment, collecting his passport from a closed cupboard. The officers took Sergei S. to the 148th precinct in Moscow and put him in a cell for approximately two hours. During that time, the officers went around the neighborhood detaining more young men.56

On December 27, 2000 early in the morning, police rang Dmitrii K.'s doorbell. When he opened the door, Dmitrii K. saw the neighborhood inspector and a recruitment officer in plain clothes who immediately grabbed him without explanation and took him away. The officers took Dmitrii K. straight to the recruitment office.57

Detentions Based on Profiling of Conscription-Age Men

In both Moscow and St. Petersburg, police have conducted random identity checks of men of conscription age on streets, at metro stations, and in other public places, and detained those whose names were on the lists of military recruitment offices. In the fall of 2001, Moscow police systematically used this method at several metro stations in the morning and evening hours, detaining dozens of young men. Following strong protests from the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia as well as in the press, this tactic was not repeated in the spring 2002 conscription period.

On November 27, 2001, Alexander B. was on his way to work when police stopped him at the Shchukinskaia metro station in Moscow and asked him for identification. The officer took him to a man in military uniform, who then checked his name against a list. When they established Alexander B.'s name was on the list, the policeman commandeered him into a bus that was parked outside the metro station. Six other young men-all had been detained in similar fashion-were already waiting in the bus. Alexander B. spent the next two hours on the bus, and after police brought in another eight young men, the bus drove them to the local recruitment office.58 Alexander B. had finished the officers' training program at his university and was not eligible for ordinary military service.

In another case, police officers stopped "Konstantin L." on December 3, 2001, at 8:00 a.m. outside a metro station in St. Petersburg.59 After checking his identity, they called the recruitment office, which informed them that Konstantin L. had been expelled from the university and no longer had grounds for deferring his military service. The officers took Konstantin L. to the local police precinct, from which he was taken to a military recruitment office.

Detentions that occur as a result of identity checks in public places based on profiles violate provisions under Russian law. The Russian law on the police allows officers to check people's documents only "if there are sufficient grounds to suspect them of having committed a criminal offense or a misdemeanor..."60 The mere notion that a person is a male of conscription age does not alone satisfy the "sufficient grounds" requirement.

Accelerated Conscription Proceedings

Draft boards failed to process the young men interviewed for this report diligently and fairly. In violation of Russian conscription regulations, medical examinations were superficial, and draft boards frequently refused to consider possible grounds for exemption or deferral. In some cases, local draft boards processed cases of young men whose residence permits were for elsewhere.61

As stated above, during conscription proceedings ordinarily a panel of medical doctors examines a candidate to determine his fitness for military service, and a draft board then determines whether and where he should serve. In cases of conscription through detention these procedures are accelerated and minimized significantly. All young men interviewed for this report said that draft boards processed them with remarkable speed, giving them preference over young men who had duly responded to draft summonses. Each said that within a matter of hours, a panel of seven medical doctors had examined him and a draft board had reviewed their files and made a decision to draft him. One interviewee, who had been at the military recruitment office several times in previous years, commented as follows:

I was told that I had to go to the medical commission. I was finished within fifteen minutes. That had never happened before. Previously...I always lost an entire day . There were people sitting but I was taken everywhere skipping the line.62

Under conscription regulations, after a conscript has been drafted by a draft board, he departs at a later date for his military base; in the interim, he is allowed to go home; none of the men interviewed for this report were allowed to go home. Rather, on the very day they were detained and examined, officials drove them to the collection point, where another panel of doctors examined them and the municipal draft board reviewed the conscription order in the same speedy fashion as at the local level. In each case, the conscription order was confirmed. Then, representatives from military units (called, literally, "buyers;" in Russian: pokupateli), reviewed their files and determined where they would serve. Most of the young men interviewed were sent off to their military bases that same day. The others were locked up in the military recruitment office or sent temporarily to a local military unit, and sent to their designated units in subsequent days. For example, Andrei S. and about thirty others like him spent four days locked up in the military recruitment office in St. Petersburg before being sent to a Ministry of Internal Affairs unit in Moscow.63 Sergei S. and several young men with him were driven to a local military unit in Moscow for a night to await departure to their military units the next day.64

Medical Examinations

All young men interviewed for this report said the medical examinations at the local and municipal level were conducted in a cursory manner. The doctors refused to listen to their assertions of serious medical conditions, and in some cases the young men did not even see all the required doctors.

Andrei S., who has had a severe limp since childhood, referred in vain to his condition; one of the doctors told him that "half this city limps" and that he was fit for service.65 Sergei S. told Human Rights Watch he was taken around to the doctors in handcuffs; while some of the doctors asked why he was handcuffed, only one asked pertinent questions about his health. This doctor asked Sergei S. about the fact that he was flatfooted, and decided that he was fit for service with some minor restrictions. The other doctors merely referred to a report issued by a 1998 medical examination at the military recruitment office, which stated he was healthy: "In 1998 you were in fine health so now you are in fine health." They ignored Sergei S.'s assertion that he had suffered a severe concussion a year earlier. Sergei S. said that within fifteen minutes all seven doctors had seen him.66

Dmitrii K. told Human Rights Watch no physician examined him. Officers kept him in a locked room while an official went to the various doctors to get their signatures ascertaining that he was fit.67 Dmitrii K. and his wife both saw his medical file and told Human Rights Watch that one person had signed for the dentist, the ophthalmologist, and the surgeon. The municipal draft board office repeated a similarly superficial procedure later that day, after he had been brought to the collection point.

Ignoring Deferral or Exemption Grounds

Several young men who were drafted told Human Rights Watch that both local and municipal draft board officials refused to examine valid claims to deferral or exemption. In rare cases, they said, officials paid attention to such claims asserted by others, but only when relatives could be contacted and could bring physical evidence to the recruitment office.

When he was detained in May 2002, Stepan O. repeatedly told the Ostankino district draft board in Moscow that as a student at the University of the Russian Academy for Education he had a right to deferral. In response, he told his mother, officials threatened to send him to Butyrka prison if he refused to serve.68 The draft board drafted Stepan O. the day of his detention, citing notification it had received from the university that he had been expelled for failure to pay tuition. It ignored his claims that the papers confirming his continued studies were at home.69 That day, Stepan O. was sent to a military unit in Reutov. The university later confirmed in court that Stepan O. had indeed been reinstated shortly after he was expelled.70 After two courts found Stepan O.'s conscription to have been lawful, the Moscow municipal procuracy filed a protest against the conscription and asked the commander of his military base to send him home. Stepan O. currently is continuing his studies.

Similarly, the Kuntsevo district draft board in Moscow ignored Alexander B.'s contention that he had finished the officers' training program at his university.71 Officials said they had not been informed of his participation in the program and refused to verify it with the university.72 They also said they desperately needed rank-and-file soldiers, while they had a sufficient number of officers. Officials ignored documents from the university confirming Alexander B.'s status, which his parents and girlfriend brought in, and designated him to serve as a rank-and-file soldier in the border troops.73

The Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia has received a number of complaints from the parents of young men who were conscripted through detention even though their government jobs entitled them to a deferral. For example, on December 6, 2001, police detained a young man who was working at the Moscow fire department. At the recruitment office, the draft board decided to draft the young man despite the fact that, according to his mother, he had documents with him confirming he was a firefighter.74

Alexander B. and Sergei S. told Human Rights Watch that they witnessed officials reluctantly consider deferral or exemption claims made by other young men detained together with them, but only when relatives could be contacted and could bring supporting documents to the recruitment office.75 It was unclear why military officials refused to take into consideration Alexander B.'s papers showing his right to exemption from the ordinary conscription procedure.

Denying Requests to Inform Relatives

In most cases, though, police and military officials routinely deny requests from the young men to be allowed to call their relatives, in an apparent attempt to avoid having relatives intervene in the conscription proceedings and perhaps to avoid receiving documentation that might provide legitimate grounds for exemption or deferral. While some young men were lucky enough to have an opportunity to call from a mobile phone, others managed to inform relatives of their whereabouts only after reaching their military bases. In several cases, worried relatives called around to hospitals and morgues in search of their children or reported them missing to the police.

The practice of denying requests by those detained to contact relatives or advocacy groups is inconsistent with the right to appeal, as it effectively strips the young men of the opportunity to exercise that right. Also, the Russian constitution grants the right to access to a lawyer to "every" detainee "from the moment of his detention."76 However, Human Rights Watch is not aware of any cases in which those detained for conscription purposes sought access to a lawyer.

In an application to the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia, "Anna K." (not her true name) wrote that her son went to Moscow on December 22, 2001 from their home in Moscow province and did not return. Three days later, she reported him missing to the police. Finally, on December 27, 2001, she received a telegram from her son in which he said that he had been drafted, as police had detained him in Moscow and taken him to the military recruitment office.77 In another similar case, reported by the Moscow newspaper Moskovskii komsomolets, on December 6, 2001, a nineteen-year-old man left his home for a job interview. When he did not come home that evening, his parents began to worry and started calling hospitals and morgues. When they contacted the local police precinct, officers advised them to call the military recruitment office. Recruitment officials, however, denied that Anna K.'s son was in their custody. Yet, later that night, a young man rang the doorbell and informed the worried parents that their son was at a collection point. He had been detained that morning at the metro station.78

Maksim K.'s case is also characteristic. Police detained him outside his home in St. Petersburg on November 28, 2001 and brought him to the recruitment office. Maksim K. told Human Rights Watch that he asked to phone home when he was informed that he would be sent to his military unit that same day. An official declined the request, saying: "If you call now, all sorts of relatives are going to come over. We don't need that."79 Maksim K. was finally able to make a phone call from the train station that evening just before boarding the train to his military base.

Denial of the Right to Appeal a Conscription Order

Russian citizens have the right to appeal their conscription, but conscription officials routinely deny young men conscripted through detention this right. All but one of the young men interviewed for this report were sent to their military bases straight from the recruitment offices without being allowed time to prepare and file an appeal with a court. When the young men expressed a wish to appeal the conscription order, officials simply denied their requests. Human Rights Watch interviews indicated that conscription officials as a rule do not inform them of their right to appeal.

The law on military service provides for the right to appeal conscription orders in court and implies that a young man must be given an opportunity to exercise this right before he begins his military service.80 Article 28(7) explicitly states that any court appeal suspends a conscription order until the court's decision enters into legal force.81 The European Convention of Human Rights also grants potential conscripts a right to appeal, although it does not state that a young man must have an opportunity to exercise this right prior to starting military service.82 Under ordinary circumstances, conscripts would have time to file a court appeal before they had to depart for their base.83 While conscription regulations do not specify the length of this interval, it can range from one day to three months.

Yet, officials seem to believe this provision does not apply to those conscripted through detention. Indeed, in a trial monitored by Human Rights Watch, a recruitment office representative denied that conscription regulations require that young men have the opportunity to go home before departure to their military units, even in cases not involving conscription through detention. He said that since regulations do not state a specific time period, the conscripts could be summoned to start their service the same day they appear before the draft board.84 In that same case, the representative also claimed that if a young man does not explicitly request a copy of the conscription order he thereby forfeits his right to appeal. Although the law on military service does not make the right to appeal dependent on a request for a copy of the conscription order, the court accepted the reasoning and ruled that the right to appeal was not violated in the case.85 An appeals court later confirmed the decision.

Several young men interviewed for this report told Human Rights Watch they informed draft officials that they wanted to appeal the conscription decision. Alexander B. told officials that he considered his conscription to be unlawful and that he wanted to appeal. Officials at the local draft board told him he could appeal the conscription order only at the collection point. In protest Alexander B. refused to sign his military identification card, to which officials responded with indirect threats, saying that although "we don't care, we'll send you off anyway," other conscripts "might not like his attempts to be special."86 At the collection point, officials told Alexander B. that they do not make decisions on conscription but merely serve as a transfer point. He was told that he could try to appeal the decision from the military unit. When Alexander B. asked whether he was not supposed to get time to pack his bags and say goodbye to his relatives, officials answered that "that is only given to those who come voluntarily."87

Dmitrii K. informed officials at the collection point that he might want to appeal his conscription order or exercise his right to conscientious objection, and that he would have to give notice to his employer in case he was forced to serve. He requested that he be given time to make up his mind. This request, however, was flatly denied and Dmitrii K. was sent to a military base that same evening. 88

Several other young men told Human Rights Watch that they were not aware of their right to appeal and that officials had not informed them of it. Indeed, conscription regulations do not stipulate whether draft board officials are obliged to advise young men of their right to appeal when they announce the conscription decision. The conscription order and the service summons also do not contain any information on the right to appeal.

Appeal from Military Bases

After a conscript has been sent to a military base, he theoretically can appeal a conscription decision in court, and in practice several have done so. However, these appeals have been fraught with difficulties because they do not suspend military service, and because a soldier serving at a military base is isolated from the individuals and institutions vital to an effective court appeal. What is more, even if a court rules in favor of the conscript no procedure exists in Russian law by which he can be released from service.89

Conscripts who have already started their service are unlikely to be able to take part in the preparation of the case and in the court hearings. Communication with representatives is also complicated as conscripts often serve far away from their home regions, where the case would be heard, and have limited access to telephones. Moreover, their written correspondence is subject to censorship.

A conscript seeking to appeal a conscription order needs a third person or public organization to represent him in court, as he would be unable to prepare his case or attend hearings. He must grant his representative power of attorney, which the unit commander must notarize.90 This may have repercussions for the conscript, as the commander will realize the conscript is going to appeal the conscription order, which is not in his interest. A conscript can also choose to be represented by a public organization and write a letter to the organization asking it explicitly to represent him in court. The organization's board can then appoint a representative and the head of the organization can notarize the power of attorney. Very few conscripts are likely to be aware of this alternative.

Syria

Article 40 of the 1973 Constitution of Syria states that "military service is compulsory and regulated by law" (Syria Mar. 1973; Coalition 17 Nov. 2004). Under the Service of the Flag Law of 1953, all Syrian males, with the exception of Jews, must serve in the military (GlobalSecurity.org n.d; see also Coalition 17 Nov. 2004). Exemptions are provided for males who are the only son in the family, have health problems (UK 27 Oct. 2006, para 9.03; Coalition 17 Nov. 2004) and are students (ibid.). In slight contrast, the United States (US) Reciprocity Schedule indicates that students may obtain a postponement of military service (15 Feb. 2007).

Certain Syrian males may be exempt from military service if they pay a fee (US 12 Feb. 2007; Syria n.d.). According to the Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic in Canberra, Australia, these include the following groups:

1. Syrians who were born outside Syria, under the condition of continuous residency until reaching the age of 18 years ... will pay USD 2,000.

2. Syrians who have left Syria before the age of 12 years, under the condition of continuous residency until reaching the age of 18 years ... will pay USD 5,000.

3. Syrians who have left Syria after the age of 12 years and are classified under one of the following two cases:

First: The Syrian applicant will pay the amount of USD 10,000 as exemption fee if he has been a resident for 10 years or more, and one of the following two conditions apply in his case:

a. He has obtained a higher educational degree (Master – Ph.D.) in one of the scientific fields (Medicine – Pharmacy – Engineering), and wishes to return to Syria for work and permanent residency.

b. He wishes to terminate his residency and return to Syria and start an investment with more than USD 10,000, according to the Legislative Decree No. 10 dated 1991.

Second: The Syrian applicant will pay the amount of USD 15,000 as exemption fee if he has been a resident for 15 years or more, and does not hold a higher education degree nor wish to terminate his residency and return to Syria.

4. Syrians who have reached the age of 40 years will pay USD 15,000 if they hold Australian legal residency regardless for how long.

5. Syrians who have reached the age of 52 years will pay USD 1,000 only as a penalty for not serving the compulsory military service. (Syria n.d.)

The Europa World Year Book 2006 and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers report that military service is for 30 months (Europa 10 June 2006; Coalition 17 Nov. 2004). However, the US Department of State indicates that, in January 2005, Syria decreased the duration of compulsory military service to 24 months (12 Feb. 2007).

Syrian males are required to register for military service when they reach 18 years of age (GlobalSecurity.org n.d.; Coalition 17 Nov. 2004). The United Kingdom's (UK) 2006 country report on Syria states that males may be conscripted between the age of 18 and 40 years (27 Oct. 2006, para. 9.02). Sources indicate that the age limit for performing reserve duty is between 45 and 50 years (UK 27 Oct. 2006, para. 9.02; see also Coalition 17 Nov. 2004). A Canadian embassy official in Damascus stated that "military service is between 18 and 49" years (28 Mar. 2007).

Information on the penalties for draft evasion and occasions for which proof of military service status is required, as well as whether the government can recall individuals who have completed their military service, was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate. However, the UK Country Report referring to a War Resisters' International (WRI) report published in 1998, explains that Syrian nationals living outside the country are often subject to questioning upon re-entry into Syria, and that they may be charged with draft evasion (27 Oct. 2006, para. 9.04). The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005 notes that some Syrian emigrants who were visiting the country were jailed for failing to pay the exemption fee for military service (8 Mar. 2006, Sec. 2). The Canadian Embassy Official provided the following information:

The military conscription office will send a notification to the conscript's nearest police station to be delivered to the person concerned two to three weeks of the calling date. If the person fails to show up at the conscription office by the deadline, the person's name will be distributed to all border posts and the local police will start looking him.

People who evade military service will not be able to obtain a passport or travel outside the country. They will not be able to work for the government and if they get picked up at any time, they will be conscripted and sent for training immediately. Most Syrians do perform their military service because it becomes almost impossible to do anything. (28 Mar. 2007)

With respect to proof of military service status, the US Reciprocity Schedule indicates that individuals are issued a certificate of military service when they are discharged from the military (15 Feb. 2007). The 1998 WRI report states that after registering for military service, males are issued a document explaining the particulars of their service and whether they are eligible for postponement (UK 27 Oct. 2006, para. 9.02). According to WRI, the Syrian authorities can demand males produce this document at any time (ibid.). The 1998 report also states that failure to present oneself for military service can result in one month to five years in prison during wartime, and that leaving Syria to avoid conscription may result in a prison sentence of three months to two years, as well as having to pay fines (ibid.). This information could not be located on the WRI Web site and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The Canadian Embassy Official stated that the government can recall individuals who have already completed their military service and that it is typically done according to date of birth and date of military service (Canada 28 Mar. 2007).

Taiwan

Procedures Followed by the Military to Call Up Conscripts

The Military Service Guide, published by the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China, outlines four phases in the recruitment of eligible conscripts for military service: investigation, conscription checkup, drawing, and recruitment (Taiwan n.d.a, "Four Steps of Conscription" Section).

Conscripts, in the investigation phase, are summoned to a recruitment office where they, or a family member, must submit various documents for verification including identification, a photo, and a household registration (ibid.).

The conscription checkup, or phyisical, allows for the triage of potential recruits into three categories: standing service for active members, substitute service, and exemption status (ibid.).

The drawing phase involves the random assignment of draftees in the standing service category to a particular branch of the armed forces (ibid.).

In the final phase, recruitment orders are sent to draftees ten days before service begins, specifying where and when to report for duty (ibid.).

Alternative Service

According to Taiwan's Government Information Office Website, under the Implementation Regulations for Substitute Conscription of 2 February 2000, conscripts "deemed unsuitable for regular military service" could choose to apply to perform an alternative military service (Taiwan n.d.b; see also Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 17 Nov. 2004).

A 2 March 2006 article by the South China Morning Post reported that some seven per cent of Taiwanese conscripts were fulfilling their military service through substitutive conscription. The news article stated "the government sets a quota for substitute service" and that 4,100 such positions were made available in 2005 (South China Morning Post 2 Mar. 2006). However, according to the Taiwanese government, approximately 12,200 men served substitute services in 2003 (Taiwan 2005), up from 10,000 in 2002 and 8,300 in 2001 (ibid. n.d.b; see also Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 17 Nov. 2004).

Among the jobs available to those who choose to apply for an alternative service are the following: "work in weather stations, protecting reservoirs, assisting ambassadors, fighting fires, promoting tourism, training athletes, and teaching or working as a medical assistant in remote mountain areas" (South China Morning Post 2 Mar. 2006; see also Taiwan 2005; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 17 Nov. 2004). There is also a demand for substitute service officers in the high tech industry (CNA 6 Jan. 2006) as well as in the field of competitive sports (ibid. 5 Jan. 2006).

Exemptions from Military Service

Article 35 of the Military Service Act stipulates that prison inmates and students of public or registered private senior high schools can have their obligatory military service deferred; however, once they have completed their sentence or their schooling, they are still required to complete their military service (Taiwan 2 Feb. 2000). The Taiwan Yearbook 2005 mentions that college students are also eligible to defer military induction until the completion of study. Regarding inmates, the same source stated that citizens sentenced to five-year jail terms or those who have already served three years in prison "are eligible for service" (Taiwan 2005).

Under Article 28 of the Conscriptions Regulations, as cited in the Military Service Guide, upon receiving an induction notice but before reporting for service, such draftees as sailors who travel overseas or draftees who are injured or draftees who are too ill to undergo military training, among others, may apply for draft deferment (ibid. n.d.a, "Deferred Draft" Section).

Health-related Exemptions

According to the Website of Taiwan's Government Information Office and the Taiwan Yearbook 2005, which this office publishes, health is a factor in determining exemption from military service (see also Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 17 Nov. 2004).

Article 4 of the Military Service Act stipulates that

man who is mentally or physically disabled or serious illness reach the service standard exempted from the Military Service, called Exempted from Induction (Taiwan 2 Feb. 2000). Soldiers who became ill during the course of service are entitled to sick leave, provided they obtain documentation from a military physician (Taiwan n.d.a, "Holidays and Leaves" Section). Initial diagnosis is performed on-site where the serviceman is stationed and, if the medical condition is deemed serious, then leave is granted to pursue treatment at a military hospital (ibid., "What Do You Do If You Are Sick?" Section). The military provides free medical treatment for servicemen through its own hospitals (ibid.).

Soldiers can also apply to suspend their service for health reasons, in accordance with Regulations for Service Termination due to Sickness of 14 January 2004 (Taiwan n.d.a, "How Does One Apply for Termination Due to Sicknes?" Section). However, once their military service is suspended, they are responsible for any expenses incurred at military hospitals, as they are no longer considered servicemen (ibid.). Once the period of suspended service has elapsed, the soldiers must undergo an assessment of their physical condition to determine whether they are fit to resume service (ibid.).

According to a 27 February 2006 Canadian Press (CP) article, a Taiwanese soldier "convicted of faking a health report to avoid military service ... could face a maximum five years in jail."

Residency-related Exemptions

According to Article 3 of the Punishment Act for Violation of Military Service, a man of military service age who leaves Taiwan in order to avoid recruitment into military service can face a prison term exceeding five years if found guilty (Taiwan 8 Feb. 1972). According to Article 4 of the Act, a man who has already been recruited but likewise departs the country to avoid service can face a jail term of less than five years (ibid.). Additional information on whether a Taiwanese who evaded conscription by leaving the country would be arrested and forced to serve upon his return, however, could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

Turkey

1.

A) (Amendment : 3970 - 16/02/1994)

Article 63: 1A) Amendment: 3970

Date of acceptance: 16.2.1994

Article 63, Paragraph 1 Section A of the Military Criminal Law Number 1632 of date 22.5.1930, which was amended by Law 4726 of 30.4.1945, has been amended as set out below:

A) Those who without an acceptable excuse are, during peacetime, absentee conscripts, draft evaders or unregistered and of whom the first contingent of peers or friends with whom they have been processed have been sent off, and those reserve recruits who have been called up and without excuse, and starting from the date of their peersbeing sent off...

- arrive within seven days shall be imprisoned for a term of up to one month;

- are arrested shall be imprisoned for a term of up to three months;

- arrive from between seven days to three months shall be imprisoned for a term ranging from three months to one year;

- are arrested from between seven days to three months shall be imprisoned for a term ranging from four months to one-and-a-half years;

- arrive after three months shall be imprisoned for a term ranging from four months to two years;

- are arrested after three months shall be punished with term of heavy imprisonment ranging from six months to three years.

Article 2 - This law shall be effective three months from the date of its publication.

Article 3 - The Council of Ministers shall implement this law’s statutes.

Article 63 1-B) (Altered 4726- 30.4.1945)

Those recruits mentioned in section (A), who arrive or are arrested and then escape before arriving at the unit, shall be punished with a further term of imprisonment from between one month to one year.

2. During mobilization , those persons mentioned in the first paragraph and those who are on leave who, from the day of transfer...

-arrive within seven days shall be liable to a term of imprisonment from between one month to one year, whilst those who are caught a term of imprisonment from between four months to two years;

-arrive between seven days and three months shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of not less than two years, whilst those who are caught a term of imprisonment of not less than three years,

-arrive of their own accord more than three months later shall be liable to a term of heavy imprisonment of not less than five years, while those who are caught shall be condemned to death. In less serious cases, the capital penalty may be commuted to life imprisonment or a heavy imprisonment term of not less than ten years, and in other cases the other penalties set out shall be reduced by half.

Article 64 - Penalties for reserve officers and military officers who are called up but do not arrive (Amendment : 4257 - 15/06/1942) 1. In accordance with Article 15 of Law No : 1076, in peace time, those reserve officers and military officers who do not arrive at their military branch-office within the period specified by the Ministry of National Defence after being called up, and who are arrested within 15 days after the expiration of the period, shall be punished with terms of one to six months’imprisonment; those who are arrested after 15 days and within three months shall be punished with terms of six months to one year; those who are arrested after three months shall be punished with terms of up to five years’ heavy imprisonment. Penalties for those who arrive of their own accord within these periods shall be reduced by half.

2. In mobilization , those reserve officers and military officers who are called up and do not arrive at their military branch-office within the specified period and from the end of this period...

- arrive within seven days shall be punished with a prison term from three months to two years, whilst those who are caught from between six months to three years,

- arrive from between seven days to three months with a term of imprisonment of not less than three years and those who are caught with a term of imprisonment of not less than three years,

- arrive after three months with a heavy term of imprisonment of not less than five years, and those who are caught shall be punished with the death penalty.

3. Reserve officers and military personnel who upon a call-up to military service arrive at the branch-office but do not set out for their local place-assigned within 12 days in peace time or four days during mobilization , and those who spend more than half of these periods en route not including the travel time and thereby do not reach their duty or official station shall be imprisoned for a term of up to three months in peace time, and from between three months to five years during mobilization . The periods set down in this paragraph and in Article 65 may be extended or reduced by the Ministry of National Defence as the need arises.

In less serious cases, the provisions set out in the last paragraph of Article 63 shall be applied in respect of the penalties set down in this article.

4. The situations set out in Articles 13 and 15 of Law No : 1076 shall be taken into consideration when this article is applied.

Article 65 - Punishment of those who do not complete their duty or mission (Amendment : 6889 - 25/01/1967) Those commissioned officers, government employees for the military and non-commissioned officers who without justifiable excuse do not leave for their duty or official stations where they have been appointed within 15 days of receipt of such an order in peacetime or six days during mobilization , who do not join up with their duty and official stations, or spend more seven days en route in peacetime or three days en route during mobilization , not including the time needed for the journey, shall be imprisoned withterms of up to three months and terms of three months to five months during mobilization . In the event of a repeated offence, if the first instance occurs in peacetime, they shall be imprisoned with a term of six months, and if it occurs during mobilization , then they shall be imprisoned with a term of eight months; if both instances occur during mobilization , then they shall be imprisoned for a term of one year.

The provisions of Article 66 shall be implemented for those who do not join up with their unit in peacetime within six days, andduring mobilization within three days, of the end of the period allowed for them to set out and join up as detailed above.

Article 66 - Desertion and Punishment (Amendment : 3574 - 14/06/1989) 1. The below mentioned military personnel shall be punished with terms of one to three years’ imprisonment:

A) Those who move away from their unit or place where they perform their duty for more than six days without leave;

B) Those who, having left their unit or place where they perform their duty to take leave, rest or a change of atmosphere, do not arrive within six days of the day when they are supposed to have returned, and have no excuse for so doing;

2) The penalty shall not be less than two years’ imprisonment for the cases set down below:

A) If the offender takes away with him arms, ammunition, any item of equipment or means of transportation thereof, any animal or anything assigned to the army;

B) If the offender escapes while serving;

C) If the offender repeats the offence;

3. The permitted time periods set out in this article shall be reduced by half during mobilization .

Article 67 -Punishment for those who flee abroad (Amendment : 3574 - 14/06/1989) 1) The below mentioned military persons shall be punished with terms of threeto five years’ imprisonment on the assumption that they have fled abroad:

A) Those military persons who leave the country’s borders without permission after they have been absent for three days;

B) Those whose prisoner of war status has ended, and who do not approach a unit or military authority, whether on purpose or through negligence;

C) Those who do not approach a Turkish warship, the nearest Turkish consulate or the office of an allied government, on purpose or through negligence, after having been separated from a ship or an airplane while abroad.

2. ) The permitted time period set out in paragraph (A) shall be reduced to one day during mobilization .

3. ) Punishment for those who flee abroad shall not be less than five years’ imprisonment, and shall be increased by up to ten years’ imprisonment in the following cases:

A) (Amendment : 2632 - 22/12/1934) If the offender takes away with him arms, ammunition, any item of equipment or means of transportation thereof, any animal or anything assigned to the army;

B) If the offender escapes while serving,

C) If the offender repeats the offence,

D) If the offender escapes during mobilization .

4. If the offender mentioned in Paragraph Three is a commissioned officer or government employee for the military, he shall receive the maximum punishment .

Article 68 - Punishment for those arrested within the time period orthose who approach of their own accord (The offender shall be punished in accordance with Article 50 of Law No: 477 dated 16.6.1964. This article is abrogated by Article 64 of LawNo: 477) - Please see under Turkey

Article 69 - Punishment for those who escape to the enemy from a position besieged by enemy forces 1. Whoever escapes to the opposing force shall be sentenced to death.

2. Whoever deserts while in confrontation with the enemy or from a besieged position shall be punished with life imprisonment or limited terms of heavy imprisonment. In serious cases, capital punishment may be implemented.

Article 70 - Conspiracy to desert and its punishment 1. If more than two military persons escape together, having previously decided and agreed to do so, this shall be considered as desertion by agreement .

2. If the offenders escape abroad, the ringleaders shall be punished with terms of between five to seven years’ imprisonment, if the ringleaders are commissioned officers or government employees for the military, they shall be punished with terms of between five to ten years’ heavy imprisonment.

3. If the offenders escape within the homeland, the ringleaders shall be punished with terms of between two to five years’ imprisonment, if the ringleaders are commissioned officers or government employees for the military, they shall be punished with terms of between five to seven years’ heavy imprisonment.

4. Other offenders who escape by conspiracy shall be punished with terms of between one to three years’ imprisonment; if the desertion is to a foreign country, the punishment shall be doubled.

5. During mobilization , the ringleaders of the desertion by conspiracy shall be punished with the death penalty. Punishment of other offenders shall be increased by one half of the specified punishments.

6. (This paragraph is abrogated by Law No : 3574 dated 14/06/1989)

Article 71 - Demotion of non-commissioned officers Non commissioned officers who are punished for crimes of desertion shall be sentenced to having their rank withdrawn.

Suspension of the punishment for desertion Article 72 - 1(The first paragraph is abrogated by Article 259 of law No : 353 dated 25/10/1963) Article 72 - (The first paragraph is abrogated by Article 353 of law No : 246) 2. If they escape again, while en route, from guest houses or the units or establishments where they are located while being transferred, the punishment to which they were previously sentenced shall be doubled.

Article 73 - Reducing punishment of returnees If the deserter returns from desertion within six weeks, or within one week during mobilization , punishments mentioned in the articles above shall be reduced by as much as a half. Heavy life imprisonment or not less than five years’ heavy imprisonment shall be implemented instead of capital punishment.

Article 74 - Punishment of those who do not report those attempting desertion (This article is abrogated by Article 64 of Law No: 477) (An offender in respect of Article 74 would be punished in accordance with Article 51 of Law No: 477 dated 16.6.1964)

Article 75 - Punishment of those who assist deserters (Amendment: 4726 - 30/04/1945) Whoever...

-incites military persons to desert, or facilitates their desertion or the continuance of the desertion,

-knowingly takes on, for private or official service, deserters, those without leave, absentee conscripts, draft evaders or those unregistered , or reserve officers who are called up but do not arrive or reserve government employees for the military,

-hides them, or

-in any way whatever causes them to work in any institution or body that is with the state, city or municipality or under the supervision of the state or bank or association or professional institutions that work for the benefit of the public, or

-on receipt of notification from the government does not remove them fromprivate business,

...shall be punished in peacetime with a term of heavy imprisonment of between three months to a year, and if he repeats the offence, a term from between one year to three years,

... shall be punished during mobilization or state of emergency with a term of heavy imprisonment from between six months to two years, and if he repeats this offence during mobilization , or state of emergency, a term of up to seven years’ heavy imprisonment

2. Whoever in any way intentionally issues documents that do not conform with real events, and that serve to cause deficiencies in military strength, shall in the first instance be punished with a term of heavy imprisonment from between two years and five years, and if he repeats the offence, shall be punished with the death penalty.

Article 76 - Punishment for escaped prisoners or detainees (Amendment : 2034 - 27/06/1932) Those prisoners who escape by deceiving guards or those entrusted with guarding them or by taking advantage of their lack of attention or absence shall be punished with half of the rest of their sentence. In any event, this punishment shall not be less than one month.

Those detainees who escape in the same way shall be punished with up to six years’ imprisonment.

Article 77 - Punishment for those who escape from the place of punishment in observation-confinement Those commissioned officers and government employees for the military, who, while undergoing observation-confinement punishment, leave the place of punishment, or receive visits, without receiving permission from authorised persons to do so shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of up to one month.

(Annexed Paragraph : 2034 - 27/06/1932)

The same punishment shall be applied to those commissioned officers and government employees for the military, who, while undergoing confinement-to-quarters punishment, leave the place of punishment.

Article 78 - Fines and additional punishments for those who escape to the enemy side or foreign countries A)

1. All existing assets and property of, or accruing in the future to, those who escape to the enemy side or who, intending to keep away from compulsory service during mobilization , take refuge or remain in a foreign country, shall upon a decree be seized on the nation’s behalf. When this decree is given, the rights of offender’s relatives to assign counsel for the defence shall be reserved.

2. In the event of it being impossible to notify the accused, the decree shall be sent to his last residence, hung on the door of the military court and published in newspapers. This notification shall be reissued within three months of the date of the order declaring the end of mobilization.

3. A summary of the seizure decree shall be sent, within eight days of the decree date, to deed registration offices and the office shall be empowered to administer absentees’ assets.

4. The assets and property about which a seizure decree is taken shall remain impounded until they are sold off by the said administration. If, before these assets and property have been sold, the accused returns or is arrested, or court proceedings commence, the seizure shall be waived.

5. The livelihood of those persons whom the offender is legally obliged to maintain may be provided for from, and according to the value of, the assets that were seizedby order of the justice of the peace in the offender’s last residence.

B)

1. According to the provisions of testamentary disposition (Civil Code: 452, 453), if the offender's descendants, father, mother, sisters, brothers or spouse are living, their legally guaranteed portion shall be given to them and that which remains shall be sold off for the benefit of nation. If none of the heirs can be found, then all of the assets shall be sold off for the benefit of the nation.

2. If official investigation does not establish a financial lack of means as being the reason for the offender's return, or if this issue cannot be proven by relatives, in accordance with Paragraph number 2 of Section (A), the decree of seizure shall become absolute one year after the last notification to be made following the end of mobilization .

3. Seized assets shall be sold off in accordance with the provisions and regulations governing the sale of state assets.

4. Objections to the sale and valuation of assets shall be submitted to the court at the last place where the offender’s residence was situated or the court of the district where the offender was last located in Turkey.

5. The offender's debts shall be paid out from the portions left to the heirs. If there is no heir, three quarters of all the assets shall form recompense for the offender’s debts.

6. If after the assets have been sold off and before the termination of the period set out in (A) Paragraph number 2, it appears that the offender has died, the cost of the assets sold shall be given to the heirs.

7. After the sale of the seized assets, if the offender is acquitted following a court procedure in which he has been present, he shall have his civil rights restored as from the date of his return or arrest.He may seek or claim compensation from the state for actual loss or damage, caused to himself or his family.

C)

1. Upon a decree of seizure, all kinds of requests, applications and transactions made by the offender, intending to conceal, dispose of or reduce his personal assets during mobilization , concerning both any that are current with living persons and anytestamentary contracts and dispositions, whether reciprocated or not, whether direct or through intermediaries, shall be ruled invalid.

2. A) Those government employees, heirs, commercial and financial institutions, companies or any third parties who knowingly assist the offender, directly or indirectly to smuggle out or decrease the whole or some parts of the offender's property before or after the seizure, as set out in Paragraph (A), shall be penalised with a heavy fine of not less than double, and not more than triple, the value of the property concealed or smuggled out.

D) The offender shall lose all his executor rights that are provided under the Civil Code.

E) The statutes of limitation for criminal procedure and civil procedure shall not be applied for the offences described in this article.

CHAPTER FOUR - Rendering oneself unfit for military serviceor resorting to fraud to evade military service Article 79 - Punishment of those who deliberately injure themselves to avoid military service (Amendment - 2862 - 11/12/1935) 1. Whoever deliberately injures himself, or in any way renders himself unfit for military service or allows himself to become so shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of between one to five years.

2. If the action has destroyed his ability to work for all types of military purposes, the offender shall be punished with a term of up to seven years’ heavy imprisonment.

3. If the action has been perpetrated during mobilization , the offender shall be punished with a term of up to ten years’ heavy imprisonment; if it has been perpetrated whilst in confrontation with the enemy, then the perpetrator shall be punished with the death penalty

Article 80 - Punishment of those who render others unfit for military service Whoever also intentionally commits the offences indicated in Article 79 on another person shall also be punished with the same penalty.

Article 81 - Those who resort to fraud in order to evade their military service - (Amendment 2862 - 18/12/1935) 1. Those who, reaching military service age, change their name, send others in their place to medical examinations or military service, use another person’s identity card or military documents, or use forged certificates or documents in the military service procedure, with the intention of evading the whole, or a part, of military service, and those who, having joined up with their detachment or establishment, commit fraud or deception in any way whatsoever with the intention of evading the whole, or a part, of military service, shall be punished with a term of up to ten years’ heavy imprisonment.

2. Punishments set out in the first paragraph shall also be applied to the offenders’ accomplices. In less serious cases, the punishments set out in these articles may be reduced to a term of five years’ imprisonment.

Uzbekistan

According to Chapter 22. Crimes Against Order of Serving Military Service, Articles 287, 288 and 290 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the penalties for desertion from and evasion of military service are as follows:

Article 287. Leaving Unit or Place of Service without Official Leave

Leaving unit or place of service without official leave, as well as failure to be present at the service in time without valid excuse at retirement from the unit, at appointment at transfer, from an assignment, from leave or a medical institution for more than one day, but no more than ten days, that have been committed by a serviceman of term service after administrative penalty had been imposed for the same acts shall be punished with arrest up to six months or commitment to a disciplinary unit up to one year.

Leaving unit or place of service without official leave, as well as failure to be present at the service in time without valid excuse for more than ten days, but no more than a month days, that have been committed by a serviceman of term service, an officer, ensign, warrant officer, or a contract serviceman shall be punished with deprivation of promotion up to two months or imprisonment up to three years.

Leaving unit or place of service without official leave, as well as failure to be present at the service in time without valid excuse for more than a month that have been committed by persons indicated in Paragraph 2 of this Article shall be punished with imprisonment from five to ten years.

The acts punishable under this Article that have been committed in a combat situation, regardless duration shall be punished with imprisonment from five to ten years.

Article 288. Desertion

Desertion, that is leaving the unit or place of service without an official leave with the purpose to evade from serving military service at all, as well as failure to be present at the service with the same purpose shall be punished with imprisonment up to five years.

The same act that has been committed by an officer, praporshik, michman or a serviceman who serves military service by contract shall be punished or imprisonment from five to ten years.

Article 290. Evading from Military Service by Self-Injury or Otherwise

Self-injury, that is evading of a military serviceman from performing the duties of military service by inflicting himself an injury, as well as evading by simulation of sickness, forgery of documents, or other deceit or refusal to perform the duties of military service shall be punished with arrest up to six months, or commitment to a disciplinary unit up to one year, or imprisonment up to five years.

The same action that has been committed in a combat situation shall be punished with imprisonment from five to ten years. (Uzbekistan 22 Sept. 1994).

Vietnam

recruitment Call-up takes for military service takes place annually.

The Ministry of Defence sets quotas for each province; the provincial authorities set draft targets for districts and village military councils are responsible for reaching these targets. Such councils usually consist of local people's committee representatives, the military unit, the public security body and public health teams. The military council prepares a roster of all 17-year-olds and of all those aged 18 to 27, who have never before been called up. The military council and the local people's committee decide who is to be called up and who is entitled to exemption or deferment. Then this revised list is posted up in public. The district military draft council sends each eligible person on this list for medical examination, held in each village. The names of those who pass this examination go to the district council, which then sets quotas for each village. PLA 'troop receiving units' proceed to each village and select recruits from among those eligible. (note: This description of recruitment dates from 1987, so may now be out of date.)

It was reported in 1995 that the high desertion rate has persuaded the authorities to intensify its recruitment efforts. It is not clear what these efforts entailed.

The right to conscientious objection is not legally recognized and there are no provisions for substitute service.

Under art. 69 of the Law on Military Service, as amended in 1990, draft evasion and desertion are punishable by disciplinary and administrative measures.

Draft evasion and desertion are further punishable under the 1986 Criminal Code. According to art. 206:

"1. The penalty for anyone who is of military age but fails to fully comply with regulations on registering for the military draft, fails to comply with an induction order or fails to comply with an order to report for training, and has been the subject of administrative action but continues to commit the same violation, is from three months' to two years' imprisonment. 2. The penalty for this crime in one of the following cases is from a year to five years' imprisonment: a) If it involves self-inflicted injury or self-inflicted harm to one's health b) If it is committed during time of war c) If another person is drawn into committing the same crime."

Draft evasion in aggravating circumstances is punishable by five to 10 years' imprisonment (arts. 259 and 260).

Surrender to the enemy and unwarranted desertion from a unit during combat situation is punishable by death. (art. 256)

practice Desertion and draft evasion are widespread. The end of the war with Cambodia in 1989, a major cause of draft0 evasion and desertion in the 1980s, does not seem to have led to a decrease of draft evasion. Reasons include the poor conditions in the armed forces; the policy of economic liberalisation has meant that an army career no longer necessarily seems a means of upward social mobility.

Figures on the number of young men evading military service are not available, but draft evasion is believed to happen more in the south than in the north of the country.

Desertion rates seem to have fallen in the 1990s, although just how reliable the figures are is debatable. In 1990 up to 34 per cent of troops were reported to be deserting before the end of military service; in 1992 the desertion rate was said to be 10 per cent; in 1995 between three and five per cent.

Because of the recruitment quota system a typical draft evasion device is supplying a substitute person known to be in bad health, who would thus be exempted for medical reasons. Another way of evading military service is by simply not turning up for the medical examination, assuming there is no outcome thanks to the faltering bureaucracy.

It is not clear how far draft evasion and desertion are in practice monitored and penalized. Different sources reach different conclusions on the extent to which monitoring and punishment of draft evasion and desertion occur.

Amnesty International thinks desertion may be considered a political crime as the criminal code specifies re-education as a penalty for desertion, and re-education is usually connected with political crimes. Another source suggests that desertion does not carry the same stigma in Vietnam as it does in Western Europe and that the reasons for desertion would be borne in mind when a sentence is passed.

In the 1980s certain draft evaders and deserters seem to have been sentenced to re-education or to labour- and construction work in remote areas and in Laos. The end of war with Cambodia in 1989 meant a considerable mitigation of the possible penalties for draft evasion and desertion as peacetime regulations became applicable - the state of war was officially abolished in 1989.

After the unification of South and North Vietnam in 1976 thousands of people fled from Vietnam, many of them being draft evaders and deserters. In the Memoranda of Understanding that were signed between the Vietnamese government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, provisions were made about not persecuting those who returned for military crimes. There are no known cases of returned refugees having been punished for draft evasion or desertion, although it must be noted that reliable information on such matters is hard to obtain from Vietnam.

Conscription by country

Arguments of the proponents of conscription

Political and moral motives

Jean Jacques Rousseau argued vehemently against professional armies, feeling it was the right and privilege of every citizen to participate to the defense of the whole society and a mark of moral decline to leave this business to professionals. He based this view on the development of the Roman republic, which came to an end at the same time as the Roman army changed from a conscript to professional force. Similarly, Aristotle linked the division of armed service among the populace intimately with the political order of the state. Niccolò Machiavelli argued strongly for conscription, seeing the professional armies as the cause of the failure of societal unity in Italy.

Other proponents such as the late William James consider both mandatory military and national service as ways of instilling maturity in young adults. Some proponents such as Jonathan Alter and Mickey Kaus support a draft in order to reinforce social equality, create social consciousness, break down class divisions and for have young adults to immerse themselves in public enterprise.

Economic & resource efficiency

It is estimated by the British military that in a professional military, one company deployed for active duty in peacekeeping corresponds to three inactive companies at home. Salaries for each are paid from the military budget. In contrast, volunteers from a trained reserve are in their civilian jobs when they are not deployed.

Arguments of the opponents of conscription

Military service is opposed on many merits. Pacifists are opposed to waging war in general. Many liberals are opposed to forced labor. Many studies have shown the severe ordeal and stress endured by conscripts, along with the occupational hazards, and hazing. Economists have calculated that it would be more cost-efficient to shift from conscription to a professional army. Some consider obligatory military service as an outdated and inefficient national defense army training format. Conscription is also opposed for its inequality since it has traditionally been imposed only on the male population. Many societies have traditionally considered military service as a test of manhood and a rite of passage into manhood.

The military conscription experience

Conscripts typically initially train in what is generally termed Basic Training. This training provides an initial indoctrination into military life. It may be common to all recruits, officers being selected on the basis of competency shown during recruit training, or it may be for the enlisted ranks only. Basic Training emphasizes physical conditioning and military discipline but focuses more on indoctrinating trainees into the military lifestyle than on imparting specific new skills. The process of transforming civilians into military personnel has been described as a form of conditioning in which inductees are forced to give up their individuality for the good of their group. The military practices harsh discipline. Capital punishment, usually by a firing squad, was used almost universally to maintain discipline in conscript militaries during wartime. Antony Beevor has estimated the executions covered some 1% to 5% of all conscript losses in World War II. Consequently, conscripts are more likely to mutiny than volunteers (see fragging).

Related concepts

• Arrière-ban
• Authoritarianism
• Banality
• Bondsman
• Brutality
• Chivalry
• Civil conscription
• Civilian Public Service
• Civilian service
• Corvée
• Draft-dodger
• Economic conscription
• Emotional isolation
• Fascism
• Forced labor
• Gender discrimination
• Humility
• Impressment and the Quota System
• Indentured servant
• Institutionalism
• Involuntary servitude
• Jingoism
• Machismo
• Male-bashing
• Militarism
• Nationalism
• National Service
• Nazism
• Oppression
• Passion
• Passivity
• Private army
• Rite of passage
• Sacred Cow
• Serfdom
• Slavery
• Social control
• Social defeat
• Sovereignty
• The Establishment
• The Man
• Torture
• Vassalage
• Violence
• Xenophobia
• Zivildienst

See also

• Alternative service
• Anti-militarism
• Bermudians Against the Draft (BAD) - a pending court case challenging the legality of continued conscription by the Bermuda Regiment as a military agency of a British Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom.
• Bevin Boys
• Conscription in Australia
• Conscription in Cyprus
• Conscription in Canada
• Conscription in Egypt
• Conscription in Germany
• Conscription in Gibraltar
• Conscription in Greece
• Conscription in Israel
• Conscription in Malaysia
• Conscription in Mexico
• Conscription in New Zealand
• Conscription in Russia
• Conscription in Serbia
• Conscription in Singapore
• Conscription in South Korea
• Conscription in Switzerland
• Conscription in the Netherlands
• Conscription in the Ottoman Empire
• Conscription in the Republic of China
• Conscription in the Russian Empire
• Conscription in the United Kingdom
• Conscription in the United States
• Conscription in Turkey
• Conscription in Western Sahara
• Flogging as military punishment
• Hazing
• Jourdan law
• Levée en masse
• List of countries by number of troops
• Men's Rights
• Mercenary
• Military history
• Military service
• Military of Albania
• Military of Algeria
• Military of Angola
• Military of Austria
• Military of Bolivia
• Military of Brazil
• Military of Cambodia
• Military of Colombia
• Military of Cuba
• Military of Denmark
• Military of Finland
• Military of France
• Military of Iran
• Military of Libya
• Military of Niger
• Military of Nigeria
• Military of Norway
• Military of Russia
• Military of Rwanda
• Military of Sudan
• Military of Sweden
• Military of Switzerland
• Military of Syria
• Military of Taiwan
• Military of Thailand
• Taliban conscription
• Timeline of women's participation in warfare
• Military recruitment
• Volunteer military

References

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25. CIA World Factbook: Chad
26. ^ CBC News Indepth: International military
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28. ^ The Economic Costs and the Political Allure of Conscription (see footnote 3)
29. Cia World Factbook: Eritrea
30. CIA World Factbook: Israel
31. CIA World Factbook: Libya
32. CIA World Factbook: North Korea
33. Roger Broad (2006), Conscription in Britain, 1939–1964: the militarisation of a generation, Taylor & Francis, p. 244, ISBN 9780714657011.
    ^ Conscription into military service, Peace Pledge Union.
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35. "Draft Women?", Time, January 15, 1945, retrieved 2008-08-12
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37. Rostker v. Goldberg, Cornell Law School, retrieved 26 December 2006.
38. Judicial Yuan Interpretation 490 translated by Jiunn-rong Yeh
39. Template:Zh iconAttachment of the standard of the class of physical condition of a draftee, Conscription Agency, Ministry of the Interior
40. Nationmaster: Land area. SOURCE: All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008.
41. Nationmaster: GDP. SOURCE: All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008
42. Nationmaster: Per capita GDP. SOURCE: All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008.
43. Nationmaster: Population. SOURCE: World Development Indicators database and CIA World Factbooks.
44. Nationmaster: Government type. SOURCE: All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008.
45. Nationmaster: Conscription. SOURCE: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland, 1997. Data collected from the nations concerned, or as otherwise indicated.
46. Conscription was abolished by law in 1973. But the Defence Act 1903 as amended retained a provision that it could be reintroduced by proclamation of the Governor-General. Potentially all Australian residents between the ages of 18 and 60 could be called up in this way. However, the Defence Legislation Amendment Act 1992 further provided that any such proclamation is of no effect until it is approved by both Houses of Parliament. Though actual legislation is not required, the effect of this provision is to make the introduction of conscription impossible without the approval of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, Gary Brown (October 12, 1999). "Current Issues Brief 7 1999–2000 — Military Conscription: Issues for Australia". Parliamentary library; Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group. Retrieved 2007-08-10.
47. South America > Bolivia > Military, nationmaster.com
48. Country report and updates: Bulgaria22 Oct 2008, War Resisters' International, 22 Octobar 2008 {{citation}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
49. Burma: World's Highest Number of Child Soldiers, Human rights Watch, October 15, 2002
50. Six Youths Conscripted into Burmese Army, Narinjara News, August 4, 2009
51. Arakanese Youth Arrested and Conscripted by Burmese Army, War Resisters' International, June 19, 2009
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54. Includes the overseas regions of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Reunion. "France", CIA World Factbook, retrieved 2008-04-09
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56. §§ 14 ff. ZDG
57. Country report and updates: Hungary, War Resisters' International, October 23, 2008
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59. ^ "Korea, North". CIA World Factbook. Retrieved 2007-08-12. (2008 est.)
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63. Macedonia: Conscription abolished, War Resisters' International, 1 Jun 2006
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65. Article II Section 4 of The Philippine Constitution reads, "The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service."
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Further reading

• Burk, James. Debating the Draft in America', Armed Forces and Society, Apr 1989; vol. 15: pp. 431–448
• Flynn, George Q. "Conscription and Equity in Western Democracies, 1940-75." Journal of Contemporary History 1998 33(1): 5-20. Issn: 0022-0094 Fulltext: in Jstor and Ebsco
• Flynn, George Q. Conscription and Democracy: The Draft in France, Great Britain, and the United States. Greenwood, 2001. 303 pp.
• Goodwin, Jason. 1998. Lords of the Horizons: A History of the Ottoman Empire
• Kestnbaum, Meyer. Citizenship and Compulsory Military Service: The Revolutionary Origins of Conscription in the United States, Armed Forces & Society, Oct 2000; vol. 27: pp. 7–36
• Kinross, John Patrick Douglas Balfour, Baron. 1977. The Ottoman Centuries, The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire
• Levi, Margaret. 1997. Consent, Dissent and Patriotism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Looks at citizens' responses to military conscription in several democracies since the French Revolution
• Leander, Anna. Drafting Community: Understanding the Fate of Conscription, Armed Forces & Society, Jul 2004; vol. 30: pp. 571–599
• MacLean, Alair. The Privileges of Rank: The Peacetime Draft and Later-life Attainment, Armed Forces & Society, Jul 2008; vol. 34: pp. 682–713
• Mjoset, Lars, and Stephen Van Holde, eds. (2002) The Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces. Amsterdam, JAI Press/Elsevier Science Ltd., 424 pages.
• Sorensen, Henning. Conscription in Scandinavia During the Last Quarter Century: Developments and Arguments, Armed Forces & Society, Jan 2000; vol. 26: pp. 313–334
• Stevenson, Michael D. (2001) Canada's Greatest Wartime Muddle: National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources during World War II. McGill-Queen's U. Press, 235 pp.

• Conscription
• Military
• Political theories